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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"People are still very ignorant about institutions, a unified theory that accepts pluralism 
is expected. " (Oliver E. Williamson, 2000) 
Overview of the Problem 
Within agricultural markets in the United States, new generation cooperatives 
are one of the most important new institutional innovations. In many states, relatively 
conservative agricultural producers are investing in relatively risky new generation 
cooperative ventures. Explaining this phenomenon is an important goal of this 
dissertation. 
Oklahoma's first new generation cooperative Value Added Products (V AP) 
recently opened in Alva, Oklahoma. The cooperative produces frozen dough products 
and started operation in 2000. To encourage new generation cooperatives, the 
Oklahoma legislature passed the "Oklahoma Agricultural Producer Credit Act" for 
Oklahoma agricultural producers who invest in Oklahoma agricultural processing or 
marketing ventures (68 O.S. Section 2357 .25). This act allows producers/investors to 
claim an Oklahoma income tax credit of up to thirty percent of their investment in 
Oklahoma producer-owned agricultural processing cooperatives, ventures or marketing 
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associations created and designed to develop and advance the production, processing, 
handling and marketing of agricultural commodities grown, made or manufactured in 
this state. If the credit allowed exceeds the tax liability, the amount of unused credit 
may be carried forward for a period not to exceed six years. Several other groups are 
organizing to form similar cooperatives in Oklahoma. 
The investment in many closed cooperatives involves a high degree of risk. 
Investors should carefully consider the risks associated with alternative investments 
before making an investment decision. Some of the risks that cooperatives face relate to 
the ability of the cooperative to attract and retain a reliable customer base and qualified 
personnel, to expand the marketing channels, and to refine the quality and quantity of 
the product to meet customer needs. 
The risks associated with V AP Cooperative are a prominent consideration 
because this investment is a start-up enterprise, which currently only sells its product to 
some big and smaller customers, and its product market (pizza dough) is highly 
competitive because of direct competition from many companies with far greater 
resources and experience. In addition, VAP Cooperative relies on a single product line, 
a limited product distribution system, and is subject to government regulations. V AP 
Cooperative also depends on its members' obligation to deliver wheat of a certain 
quantity and quality, and forces members to face the risk that they might be unable to 
deliver the required wheat to the cooperative. 
Throughout the United States, many traditional cooperatives are merging, 
forming joint ventures and coalitions, or struggling to survive while new generation 
cooperatives are increasing in size and number. Traditional cooperatives have struggled 
2 
to acquire equity because cooperative ownership per se conveys no benefit. Benefits 
generally come only on the basis of patronage. Traditional cooperatives attempt to build 
equity out of the profit stream. Members receive a portion of their· allocated profits in 
the form of stock. Generally, there is no secondary market for traditional cooperative 
stock which is redeemed at face value by the cooperative at some future date. New 
generation cooperatives attempt to solve the equity problems of traditional cooperatives 
by changing the property rights structure (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). New generation 
cooperatives have a more clearly defined membership policy (closed, or well-defined), 
a secondary market for members' residual claims, patronage and residual claimant 
status restrictions, and an enforceable member pre-commitment mechanism. 
Frequently, new generation cooperatives vertically integrate forward in the distribution 
chain. Farmers as members/owners attempt to maintain control over their operations, 
reduce risk, stabilize income, and secure new and existing markets. New generation 
cooperatives can contribute as an extension of the farm operation that allows farmers to 
make decisions and have some control over the processing and marketing of products. 
Institutions1 like new generation cooperatives have significant impacts on 
r 
economic growth and development. The capacity of institutions to change, in response 
to changes in culture and society, resource endowments, and technology is an important 
determinant of economic progress in rural areas (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984). A 
1 Institutions are seen both as rules of a society or as organizations that facilitate coordination among 
people by helping them form expectations which each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others 
(Ruttan and Hayami, p.204) and unplanned and unintended regularities of social behavior that emerge from 
the repetitive play of games (Schotter, p. 118). 
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secondary theme of this dissertation is that the efficiency of the market for institutional 
innovation is a critical determinant of economic progress. 
Effective change occurs when technology, culture, resource endowments and 
institutions change harmoniously2. Dissonance within the marketing system makes 
adoption at one level in the marketing system extremely unlikely if changes at other 
levels within the system do not occur simultaneously. 
Greater understanding of forces influencing new generation cooperative 
development could help existing cooperatives make changes to survive and facilitate the 
creation of new cooperatives. Determinants of the survival and stability of agricultural 
institutions are theoretically developed and evaluated. Hypotheses from the theory are 
then tested. 
For agricultural economists to be in a position to provide appropriate and 
effective policy advice to groups considering new generation cooperative formation, 
they must first understand the nature of the overall cooperative formation process, 
including its driving forces and essential features. Evaluation of new generation 
cooperatives requires an understanding of factors that influence the commitment of 
agricultural cooperative participants to invest and be loyal members. 
Clearly the importance of institutional change suggests a need for theoretical 
models to analyze institutional change as well as empirical analyses. Williamson (2000) 
suggests that people are still very ignorant about institutions, and he expects a unified 
2 Harmonious has been used at the firm level to describe combinations of fixed inputs whose rates of 
operation can be combined so that stages within a plant operate at compatible rates (Brems as cited by 
French, Sammet, and Bressler). This concept is extended here to include compatibility of input and output 
characteristics, volume of output, as well as rates of production. Dissonant is the opposite of harmonious. 
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theory that accepts pluralism. Coase (1998), Williamson (2000) and Demsetz (1997) 
proposed the New Institutional Economics that promises more new ideas for the study 
of institutions including cooperatives. 
Schultz (1990) has noted there is little research analyzing institutional changes in 
the agricultural marketing system. Within the agricultural marketing system, the 
capacity for coalition and cooperative formation and management of the legal and social 
contracts associated with coalitions will be a major determinant of successful structural 
and institutional development. 
A very rich theoretical foundation for the analysis of institutional change can be 
developed in game theory. Schotter (1986) argued that because of the explicit treatment 
of rules, game theory is a particularly useful way of analyzing and understanding the 
probability of institutional or rule evolution. Cooperative game theory remains 
particularly under-exploited by agricultural economists. The strength and capacity of 
cooperative game theory for application has been recognized by only a few agricultural 
economists (Horowitz, Just, and Netanyahu, 1996). 
As discussed by Togerson, Reynolds, and Gray (1997), the theory of 
agricultural cooperatives has a rich history. The development of theory of agricultural 
cooperatives has led to a greater understanding of many practical problems. For 
example, the Helmberger and Hoos model provided better understanding of the 
incentives to limit membership and revealed conflicts of interest (Torgerson, Reynolds, 
and Gray). 
Staatz (1989, p.20) accurately suggests that careful attention must be given to 
the payoffs facing individual members if defections from cooperatives are to be 
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prevented. Staatz's conclusion is that distribution of cooperative benefits is a key to 
preventing defections. 
This study extends the previous theory of agricultural cooperatives by 
integrating investment theory, non-monetary benefits, and fairness into a theory of 
cooperative development. Most responses to the forces inducing change involve the 
formation of coalitions that frequently require financial investments and have the 
potential·to create non-monetary benefits for members. Coalitions in agricultural 
marketing systems are horizontal and/or vertical groups of individuals or firms within 
the agricultural marketing system for whom a new set of binding rules or contracts are 
formed. New generation agricultural cooperatives are coalitions of agricultural 
producers. The theory of coalitions has been developed largely independently in the 
economics literature. Both Staatz (1983) and Sexton (1986) have used cooperative game 
theory to study agricultural cooperatives. 
Some evidence indicates that behavioral and economic decisions are driven by 
fairness considerations (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993; Akerlof, 1979; Okun, 
1981; Kahneman et al., 1986). This literatures suggests that producers' perceptions of 
fairness in distribution of patronage refunds affects their investment decisions in new 
generation cooperatives. Fairness behavior in cooperative investment involves strategies 
and decisions either from the cooperative or investors to achieve their maximum expected 
utility. 
The research question is: what is a plausible theory of development for new 
generation agricultural cooperatives? By knowing this theory, one can explain how non-
monetary benefits may influence investment decisions. 
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The essential difference between this paper and previous studies is that it treats 
the decision to join a closed cooperative as an investment decision and suggests that 
non-monetary payoffs and investor's perception of fairness may influence investment 
decisions. Closed cooperative investments are considered within the context of a 
portfolio of investment choices a producer can make. A member of a closed cooperative 
receives specific rights (frequently delivery rights/obligations) in return for his/her 
investment. These rights are often transferable and may change in value. Payoffs are 
· based on the amount of investment and whether the delivery obligation has been met. 
The value of the delivery right is expected to be directly related to both the size of the 
monetary distributions to the members as well as the perceived non-monetary benefits 
created for members. 
The proposed theory assumes that the perceived utility of an investment in a 
cooperative is related to the size and value of the monetary benefits of membership in a 
coalition as well as'the non-monetary return from the investment. This is consistent 
with Staatz's finding that the non-monetary benefits that some members may derive 
from belonging to a cooperative broadens the set of potentially stable solutions (Staatz 
1989, p.20). The size and value of benefits of cooperative membership are affected by 
the business environment and internal decisions of existing cooperatives. The benefits 
of a coalition are evaluated in utility functions that have monetary and non-monetary 
benefits, fairness, and risk as arguments. 
Without a clear unifying theory of coalitions in agriculture that incorporates the 
underlying non-monetary motivations and characteristics of the participants, it will be 
difficult for agricultural economists to develop appropriate hypotheses and complete 
7 
appropriate empirical work about cooperative development. Most importantly, 
producers, policy makers, and other marketing channel participants who need solutions 
to marketing problems will not have access to the information they need to evaluate 
·new cooperative development. 
This dissertation concludes that within the agricultural marketing system, the 
capacity for coalition and cooperative formation and the management of the legal and 
social contracts associated with the coalitions will be a major determinant of successful 
structural and institutional development. This dissertation extends the rich theory of 
agricultural cooperatives by integrating producers' investment behavior and non-
monetary benefits into the theory of cooperative formation using cooperative game 
theory. 
This dissertation contends that the forces inducing change in the supply and 
demand for institutions have been actively and constantly causing change within 
agricultural cooperatives. The theory of cooperative development is expanded with 
emphasis on how non-monetary benefits influence membership investment decisions. 
Some of the forces inducing change alter producers' perceptions of the actual and 
potential material payoffs and non-monetary benefits from open and closed cooperative 
participation or non-participation. Consistent with Sexton (1990) we believe that 
producers may be motivated to participate in cooperatives because they understand that 
cooperatives alter decision-making in non-cooperative firms. In addition, consistent with 
Ladd (1974), cooperatives may also produce non-monetary benefits which are restricted 
to members and may motivate membership. 
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Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to explain the development of new 
generation agricultural marketing cooperatives. The specific objectives are: 
1. To extend the theory of agricultural cooperatives by incorporating non-monetary 
benefits, the risk of investment, and fairness into the theory of coalition formation 
that influence producers' expected utility and investment decisions in new 
generation agricultural cooperatives; 
2. To test whether hypotheses from the proposed theory are supported by empirical 
evidence about producers' expected utility and investment decisions in an 
agricultural cooperative. 
Procedures 
This study has two main sections. The first section explores the theoretical 
model of cooperative investment that will accomplish objective 1. The theory of 
agricultural cooperatives is extended by incorporating non-monetary benefits, the risks 
of investment, and fairness into the theory of cooperative formation. The proposed 
theory introduces non-monetary benefits into the producers' expected utility functions 
as a measure of the influences of non-monetary benefits and fairness on the expected 
utility and investment decisions. In addition, this study also considers the risks 
associated with the investment choice. The combination of monetary and non-monetary 
benefits from investment, and the risks associated with investment, represent a 
considerable enhancement over previous standard models of coalition formation. 
The second section of this study deals with formally testing whether hypotheses 
from the proposed theory are supported by empirical evidence about producers' 
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investment decisions in agricultural marketing cooperatives. To accomplish this 
objective, the survey instruments were designed to allow for comparison of the two 
populations of wheat growers: members of the new generation cooperative, Value 
Added Products, Inc. (V AP) and wheat growers who are non-members of V AP. This 
survey was designed to test whether the non-monetary benefits, the risks of investment, 
and fairness influence cooperative investment decisions and producers' expected utility 
as members of agricultural closed cooperatives. 
Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents previous literature about research in fairness, factors 
influencing coalition stability, and the basic model of coalition formation. 
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model of cooperative investment that extends 
the theory of agricultural cooperatives by incorporating non-monetary benefits, the risks 
of investment, and fairness into the theory of agricultural cooperatives. This chapter 
includes a standard model of coalition formation, factors influencing coalition stability, 
and a proposed model of cooperative investment that incorporates non-monetary 
benefits and the risks of investment into the analysis of cooperative development. 
In chapter 4, the data collection, procedures used to test the hypotheses, and the 
empirical results of this study are discussed. The dissertation is concluded with a 
discussion of the implications of these findings for agricultural cooperative investment, 
agricultural cooperative policy and suggestions for future research in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER II 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
"The purpose of theory is not to provide answers but to help us ask the proper questions." 
(George W. Ladd, 1974) 
Review of a Basic Model of Coalition Formation 
A game in coalitional form specifies, for every coalition of players, a set of 
monetary payoff vectors that are feasible for players within the coalition if they agree to 
cooperate. A player can be an agricultural firm or an individual farmer. A coalition is 
formed and a feasible monetary payoff vector is chosen only when the coalition, the 
payoff vector and the non-monetary benefits are accepted by all players involved. 
Membership in the coalitions and the monetary and non-monetary payoffs to each 
member are the solution to the cooperative game. 
The idea of a bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler (1964); Mas-Colell (1989); 
Zhou (1994)) is used to provide a solution concept that specifies the coalition formation 
and payoff distribution. By assuming that all players in the game can bargain together 
with perfect communication, the stability of outcomes of a game depend on objections 
and counter objections to each coalition that exists. A coalition is stable if all objections 
can be met by counter-objections. The set of all stable outcomes is called the bargaining 
set. 
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Consider an n-person cooperative game<I>, with a given set of n players, 
N = {l, 2, · · ·, n} . Let { C} be the non-empty subsets C of N, called the permissible 
coalitions. For each C, C E { C} , a number v( C) is given and it is called the value of the 
coalition C. In the standard model of coalitions, v(C) is measured by material payoffs 
which are a prerequisite to coalition formation and stability. Assume that all 1-person 
coalitions in {C} have a zero value, i.e., 
(1) iE {C}, v(i) = 0 
where i is the player in the coalition {C} and the value of the coalition C is positive, 
(2) v(C)~ 0, Ce{C} 
A payoff configuration will now be defined as an expression of the form, 
(3) 
where C1, C2, ••• , Cm are mutually disjoint sets of {C} whose union is N, i.e., 
(4) and RI uC.=N 
j=l 1 
and the X; 's are the amounts received by each player (real numbers) which satisfy 
(5) LX; =v(Ci); j = l,2,-··,m 
ieCj 
Thus, a payoff configuration is a representation of a possible outcome of the game, in 
which the players divide themselves into groups, so-called coalitions, C1, C2 , ••• , Cm, 
and each coalition distributes its value among its members, and each player receives the 
amount X;, fori = 1,2,···,n. 
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When people are faced with a game, logically, it is reasonable that one does not 
expect that a payoff configuration will occur if X; < 0 , since the player i alone can 
secure more by playing as a 1-person coalition with a zero value. By assuming. that 
(6) LX; ~ v(C) for each C, CE {C}, Cc C1 , j = 1,2,-··,m. 
iEC 
the payoff configuration will be a coalitionally rational payoff configuration. Thus, the 
coalition rationality assumption is very strong as it forces the game to be essentially 
superadditive.3 Superadditivity requires that a coalition whose value is less than the 
sum of the values of disjoint subcoalitions cannot occur in any coalitionally rational 
payoff configuration. 
Usually, the bargaining process starts when each player tries to get at least as 
much as possible. Thus, during the negotiations prior to coalition formation, each 
player tries to convince his/her partners that in some sense s/he is worthy of high 
payoffs. This process can happen in various ways, among 'Yhich an important factor is 
a players' ability to show thats/he has other (perhaps better) alternatives. Partners, 
besides pointing out their own alternatives, may argue in return that even without 
his/her help they can perhaps keep their proposed shares. A negotiation is a sequence of 
objections and counter-objections. Stability is reached if all objections can be answered 
by counter-objections. 
The notion of objections and counter-objections can be illustrated using the 
following example. Let n = 3, v(l) = v(2) = v(3) = v(l23) = 0, v(12) = 100, v(13) = 100, 
and v(23) = 50 . Suppose the payoff configuration is 
3 A game is superadditive if the value of the union of two disjoint coalitions exceeds the sum of the values 
of each coalition. 
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(7) (80, 20, O; 12, 3) 
where 80 represents the amount of payoff received by player 1, 20 represents the 
amount of payoff received by player 2, and so on. The expression v(12) is the value of 
the coalition that consists player 1 and 2. In the payoff configuration above the coalition 
of player 1 and 2 (denoted by 12) generates the payoff of 100, which can be broken 
down into 80 units payoff for player 1 and 20 units payoff for player 2. The value of 
the coalition that consists player 3 alone is zero. 
Then, player 2 can object to the payoff configuration by pointing out that in the 
following payoff configuration, 
(8) (0, 21, 29; 1, 23) 
s/he and player 3 get more. Regarding player 2's objection, player 1 has no counter-
objection because s/he cannot keep his 80 while offering player 3 at least 29. Thus; the 
configuration represented by equation (7) is an unstable payoff. 
On the other hand, the following payoff configuration, 
(9) (75, 25, O; 12, 3) 
is a stable outcome. An objection of player 2, for example, 
(10) (0, 26, 24; 1, 23) 
can be met by a counter-objection 
(11) (75, 0, 25; 13, 2) 
or an objection of player 1, for example, 
(12) (76, 0, 24; 13, 2) 
can be met by the counter-objection 
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(13) (0, 25, 25; 1, 23) 
Clearly, in the counter-objections, the threatened player can keep his/her share and 
offer his/her partners at least what the player who objects offered. The stable payoff 
configurations in this game are 
(14) 
(0, 0, O; 1, 2, 3); 
(75, 25, O; 12, 3); 
(75, 0, 25; 13, 2);and 
(0, 25, 25; 1, 23) 
The formal mathematical definition of objections and counter-objections can be found in 
Aumann and Maschler (1964, p.448-449). 
The essence of the study of cooperative formation is that producers will not join a 
cooperative unless they receive a benefit from doing so. Sexton (1986) builds the model 
of cooperative formation based on the assumptions that cooperative membership is 
voluntary then individuals decide whether to join or not to join based on profit 
considerations. Clearly, Sexton's model is based on monetary payoffs that specifically 
emphasize the individual decision makers and their incentives to undertake joint action 
based upon monetary payoffs. 
Previous Research on Fairness 
There is conflicting evidence with regard to social behavior in economic 
research. Reality provides many examples indicating that people are driven by fairness 
considerations, other evidence indicates that people behave completely selfishly, and 
still other evidence suggests that motives are crucial (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Fehr 
and Schmidt provide a single simple model that incorporates fairness as "self-centered 
inequity aversion" to mediate this conflicting evidence. Inequity aversion means that 
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people resist inequitable outcomes, for example, people are willing to give up some 
material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable outcomes. Inequity aversion 
is called self-centered when people do not care per se about inequity that exists among 
other people but are only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff relative 
to the payoff of others. 
Rabin ( 1993) incorporates the notion of fairness into game theory. The notions 
of fairness are heavily influenced by the status quo and other players' motives. 
Interpretation of other players' motives relies on beliefs about their payoffs. This study 
illustrates whether social goals have important economic implications. Rabin tests 
whether adding fairness to game theoretic models substantially alters the conclusions. 
Some evidence indicates that altruistic behavior is more complex and involves elements 
of fairness. People do not seek uniformly to help other people. They do help people 
according to how fair other people are. The same producers who are altruistic to other 
altruistic producers may also be motivated to penalize those who penalize them. These 
emotions have clear economic implications and suggest that economic behavior is 
sometimes influenced by social behavior. 
Other authors used the notion of fairness to explain why many employers do not 
cut wages during periods of high unemployment (Akerlof, 1979; Solow, 1980). Arthur 
Okun (1981) went further in arguing that fairness also alters the outcomes in what he 
called customer markets. Okun explained his observations by the hostile reaction of 
customers to price increases that are not justified by increased costs and are therefore 
viewed as unfair. In Okun's model, customers who _suspected that a supplier treated 
them unfairly are likely to start searching for alternatives. The argument used by these 
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authors to account for apparent deviations from the simple model of a profit-
maximizing firm is that fair behavior is an instrument to the maximization of long-run 
profits. 
The analysis of community standards of fairness that apply to price, rent, and 
wage setting by firms in varied circumstances and the possible implications of the rules 
of fairness for market outcomes is important phenomena (Kahneman et al., 1986). A set 
of scenarios in which a firm (merchant, landlord, or employer) makes a pricing or 
wage-setting decision that affects the outcomes of one or more transactors (customers, 
tenants, or employees) is utilized to predict a community standard for actions affecting 
customers, tenants, and employees. The findings of this study suggest that many actions 
that are both profitable in the short run and not obviously dishonest are likely to be 
perceived as unfair exploitations of market power. 
Kahneman et al. (1986) identifies some of the criteria that people use in their 
fairness judgments and demonstrates the willingness of people to enforce fairness at 
some cost to themselves. Characteristics of transactors provide better predictions about 
the behavior of the firms. Kahneman et al. (1986) concludes that people care about 
being treated fairly and treating others fairly, they are willing to resist unfair firms even 
at a positive cost, and people know that there are implicit rules that specify which 
actions of firms are considered unfair. 
Factors influencing coalition stability 
This dissertation provides a scenario that explains major determinants which 
greatly affect the stability of agricultural cooperatives. Since cooperatives involve 
interaction between participants, the types of people in the coalition significantly affect 
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its stability. Recent developments in evolutionary theory (Ostrom, 2000) have begun to 
provide genetic and adaptive underpinnings for the propensity to cooperate based on the 
development and growth of social norms, such as social responsibility, trust, and 
fairness. Ostrom argued that there exist two types of norm using players - cond itional 
cooperators and willing punishers4 - in addition to rational egoists which are the 
assumption of most economists. A central finding of the theory of collective action is 
that the world contains multiple types of individuals, some more willing than others to 
initiate reciprocity to achieve benefits of collective action. Thus, a core question is how 
potential cooperators signal one another and design institutions that reinforce rather 
than destroy conditional cooperation. 
Conditional cooperators will tend to trust others as long as the proportion of 
others who return trust is relatively high. Together, conditional cooperators and willing 
punishers create a more robust opening for collective action and a mechanism for 
helping it grow. From the experimental findings, the contribution of new assumptions 
about the type of players needs to be included in a revised theory of collective action. 
This phenomenon tells us how the structure of collective action and the behavior of a 
group of players evolves. Some observers call this an evolutionary process that 
provides useful ways of modeling the emergence and survival of multiple types of 
players in a group of people. The old-style notion of pre-Mancur Olson that said groups 
would find ways to act in their own collective interest was not entirely misguided. 
4 Conditional cooperators are individuals who are willing to initiate cooperative action when they estimate 
others will reciprocate and to repeat these actions as long as a sufficient proportion of the others involved 
reciprocate. While willing punishers are individuals who are willing to punish others if the circle of 
relationships allows them to punish those who have contributed less than the minimum level (Ostrom, 
2000). 
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Fairness has economic implications. If somebody is being nice to you, fairness 
dictates that you be nice to him. Conversely, if somebody is being mean to you, 
fairness allows that you be mean to him. For example, on the positive side, if an 
employee has been exceptionally loyal to the company, then a manager may feel some 
obligation to treat that employee well, even it is not in his self-interest to do so. On the 
negative side, a consumer may not buy a product that is sold by a monopolist at an 
unfair price, even if the material value to consumer is greater than the price. By not 
buying the product, the consumer lowers his own material well-being so as to punish 
the monopolist. 
By modeling such emotions formally, we can understand their economic 
implications more generally. In this dissertation, a theoretical framework which 
incorporates such investor's behaviors with respect to socially responsible investment; 
investment risk, and fairness are engaged into a broad range of coalition development 
models. Emotions influence people's economic behavior and decisions. Obviously, full 
and accurate information about all players' types is a very strong assumption for 
explaining the development of coalitional structures. 
The study by Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) clearly supports this research. They 
conclude that characteristics in a well-defined property rights structured cooperative 
such as closed membership, obligatory member commitment, and transferable and 
appreciable equity instruments would result in greater incentives to invest in a 
cooperative than ill-defined property right policies which characterize the traditional 
cooperative structure. 
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Of particular interest in the study of cooperatives is the procompetitive impact of 
cooperatives on rural communities (Sexton). Sexton has demonstrated the importance of 
cooperatives as a part of the evolving system. Sexton suggests that in imperfectly 
competitive markets that are prevalent in rural areas, competition from a cooperative 
changes the behavior of non-cooperative producers (firms) and creates a competitive 
yardstick effect (Sexton 1990, p. 718). Sexton's study further identifies that the existence 
and magnitude of the effect are determined by membership, market structure, and 
technological conditions. Under many common conditions in agricultural markets, the 
existence of a cooperative not only provides benefits to the members of the cooperative 
but also to nonmembers dealing with non-cooperative firms that must compete in a 
spatial oligopoly with the cooperative firm. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF COOPERATIVE INVESTMENT 
"Theories are more like graduate students -- once admitted you try 
hard to avoid flunking them out . . . Theories are things to be nurtured 
and changed and built up." 
(Alan Newell, 1990) 
Introduction 
The analytical frameworks from previous studies that incorporate social and 
psychological notions into game theory are reviewed in this chapter. Based on previous 
work, monetary returns, non-monetary benefits, investment risk, and fairness influence 
cooperative formation and investment decisions. In particular, non-monetary benefits, 
relatively low investment risk, and fairness can lead to increased cooperation among 
economic agents in coalitions and increase the stability of coalition solutions. 
Most current economic models assume that people pursue only their own 
material self-interest and do not care about non-monetary goals. History shows, 
however, that in many economic and social situations, agricultural producers as 
economic agents prefer to operate in groups rather than on their own (Belleflamme, 
2000). People may care not only about their own well-being but also about the well-
being of others and derive utility from helping others. 
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The process modeled in this chapter is the development of a new generation or 
closed cooperative. This process addresses the dynamic game of producers' investment 
decisions in the closed cooperative. Initially, a prospectus for the cooperative is written. 
The prospectus contains the business plan, projections, and risks associated with that 
enterprise, and is presented to prospective investors/input suppliers for them to evaluate 
as an' investment in their portfolio of investments. Units of investment give the 
producer the right to deliver inputs to the cooperative. If enough investor capital and 
delivery commitments are secured, producers deliver their inputs, and the company 
operates. 
After the first year of operation, the cooperative allocates its earnings to its 
members (in proportion to delivery) and decides what portion to refund as cash 
patronage refunds. Members receive the remainder of their allocated patronage refunds 
in the form of stock. The cooperative also usually reports its earnings to the members 
in a written report delivered at an annual meeting of the stockholders. The value of the 
investment changes as conditions affecting the cooperative's business change and the 
cooperative develops a history of earnings and cash patronage distributions. Using the 
information in the prospectus, the outcome for the first year, and expectations for the 
future, each producer can elect to buy or sell delivery rights and evaluates whether to 
deliver inputs to the cooperative so thats/he participates fully in next year's patronage 
distribution. 
A producer decision is treated as an investment decision. Producer utility is a 
function of monetary and non-monetary benefits, investment risk, and fairness. 
Producers maximize utility subject to a wealth constraint. By formally modeling 
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producers' utility, their economic implications to the cooperative development are 
better understood. 
The Model 
An integrated model of cooperative investment based on game theory is 
proposed. This model explains coalition development, factors influencing coalition 
stability, and the producers' perceptions of the actual payoffs from coalition 
participation. Coalition structures and their evolution are examined. 
Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 
We consider the process of decision making in a closed cooperative investment 
as a dynamic game between the cooperative and the investors. In order to determine the 
set of strategies for either the cooperative association or the investors, the moves the 
players have, the order in which they choose these moves, and the information they 
have when they make their decisions must be specified. One way to organize this 
information is through the development of a game tree.5 Decision nodes in the game 
tree are represented by boxes, which contain the identity of the player who moves at 
that node. A branch represents a possible move by a player. Every branch connects two 
nodes and has a direction which is depicted by an arrowhead. 
Figure 1 displays the game tree for a dynamic closed cooperative formation and 
operation game. The game begins at the top of the game tree where the cooperative 
association initially writes a prospectus for the closed cooperative. For simplicity, it is 
assumed the cooperative either offers an optimistic or conservative prospectus as shown 
5 A game tree is a picture composed of nodes and branches, where each node in the game tree represents a 
decision point for one of the players and is said to belong to the player that moves at that point. 
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by each branch. Each branch points to a decision node for the producers since 
producers make their investment decisions after they learn and evaluate the type of 
strategies the cooperative has adopted. From each of the two decision nodes extend two 
branches representing the two possible moves producers can make. Again the decision 
is simplified as a decision to invest or not to invest. If an insufficient number of 
producers decide to invest, a cooperative firm does not form. 
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Figure 1. The Grune Tree for Dynrunic Grunes in the Case of Closed Cooperatives 
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Units of investment give the producer delivery rights to the cooperative, and the 
value of the investment will change if conditions affecting the cooperative' s business 
change. If enough investor capital and delivery commitments are secured, then 
producers deliver their inputs, and the company operates for the year. As the 
cooperative operates its business, it develops a history of earnings and cash patronage 
distributions to its members. At the cooperative's decision nodes, cooperatives elect to 
distribute high or low cash patronage refunds. Again, to simplify the game tree, a 
continuous decision is treated as two discrete choices. 
Using the outcome for the first year, and expectations for the future, each 
producer can decide to buy more or sell (transfer) stock/delivery rights. They also 
decide how much to deliver so they can participate in next year's patronage 
distribution. The sequential decision making process continues as long as the firm 
exists. 
A Model of Agricultural Marketing Cooperative 
An integrated model of coalition development is a model that considers major 
determinants influencing the stability of coalitions. Investment decisions and non-
monetary benefits from the cooperative investment are incorporated into the analysis of 
the model of cooperative membership. The crucial feature of the model is how producers' 
investment decisions and non-monetary benefits from the investment affect the stability 
of coalition structures. Another important aspect of this model is the effect of fairness on 
welfare allocations. Two important elements of fairness are the actual outcome of an 
action, and the expected outcome (reference point) from membership. 
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Investors' utility is assumed to depend not only on the material benefits but also 
on non-monetary benefits, the risk associated with the investment, and fairness. Fairness 
is formalized in the framework developed by Rabin (1993). Rabin's model incorporates 
fairness into economic research. He modifies conventional game theory by allowing 
payoffs to depend on fairness. We assume investors are more likely to invest in a 
cooperative as part of their portfolio if that investment is perceived to be fair, to have 
relatively low risk, and to provide non-monetary benefits. This section applies the theory 
of coalition development to the development of a closed agricultural processing 
cooperative. The core of the coalition development process is the value of cooperative 
investment which consists ofboth monetary and non-monetary benefits. Basically 
investors will not join a cooperative unless the benefits from doing so exceed the costs of 
JOimng. 
Producers are presented with a prospectus for an agricultural marketing 
cooperative that will add value to the raw commodity they produce. To join this 
coalition, an investor must be an agricultural producer and produce the raw material 
further processed by the cooperative. 
Members are provided the rights to subscribe for and purchase shares of 
common stock in the cooperative, and also agree to deliver raw material to the 
cooperative each year. The cooperative association distributes one delivery right for 
each share of common stock held on the record date. Each delivery right entitles an 
eligible member to deliver one unit of commodity. For example, a member may 
exercise the rights to purchase a minimum of 1,000 shares for $5,000. Each year the 
producer has the obligation to deliver 1,000 bushels of wheat. If the cooperative is 
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profitable, the ownership shares and the delivery rights will appreciate in value and 
surpluses generated by the cooperative will be distributed to the members as stock 
and/or cash in proportion to how much of the raw product (wheat) they deliver 
annually. The potential appreciation in share value and the cash patronage refund 
represent the monetary benefits from membership. 
Unlike previous work by Sexton, we assume that investors maximize expected 
utility of the investment, and their utility function includes the expected monetary 
benefits from investment, risk, fairness, and non-monetary benefits and is maximized 
subject to their wealth constraint. Membership in a new generation cooperative is 
assumed to be voluntary and potential members choose whether to invest or not to 
invest in a cooperative based on monetary, non-monetary benefits, fairness, and risk .. 
Non-monetary benefits are included because the firm is located in an area in which the 
producer may want to create employment opportunities and support economic. 
development. 
Investment theory and previous work about "revealed preference" conditions for 
validity of the utility maximization model are used and extended (Varian, 1983). The 
mean-variance model of cooperative investment captures the investor's rationality in 
undertaking investment decisions based on the expected return on investment, risk, 
fairness, and non-monetary return associated with the investment. The substantial 
difference between this model and Varian's work are the non-monetary benefits and 
fairness terms in the investor's utility function. 
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The Mean-Variance Cooperative Portfolio Model 
For notational purposes, we need to define the variables used in our equations. 
Let p = (Pi, ... , p A) denote the vector prices of the assets. x = ( x1, . .. , x A) represents the 
assets or portfolio choices. The variable R = ( Ri, ... , RA) denotes expected return on the 
portfolio choices 1, ... , A and G = ( G1, ••• , GA) represents the non-monetary benefits 
from portfolio x. The investor's expected return of portfolio x is denoted by W = Rx ;fis 
a vector of the investors' perception of fairness for each asset f = (J; , ... , f A) , and W0 
represents initial level of wealth. U(µ,o- 2 ,D,F ·) is the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility 
function which is enhanced with non-monetary benefits, risk, and a fairness component. 
The risks associated with cooperative investment as part of producers' portfolio 
are represented by variance of return on investment from the portfolio x. The variance 
of return from portfolio xis represented by <jJ x'Vx where <jJ < 0 is the risk-aversion 
parameter, and V is the variance/ covariance matrix of the investments x. The investor's 
utility from portfolio x has a mean µ and variance o-2 • Utility is a function of expected 
return on investment, the variance of return from the portfolio, perception of fairness, 
and non-monetary benefits associated with that portfolio choice. Producers are 
hypothesized to maximize utility subject to a wealth constraint: 
max U(Rx, <jJ x'Vx, Gx, ft) 
X 
subject to p · x = W0 
and x~O 
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Definition 1. We have observed a portfolio choice xi for i = 1, ... , n , a mean-
variance utility function rationalizes the observed investor behavior if and only if 
(5) 
for all portfolios x that cost the same or less thani. That is: /x ~ pixi or 
/ (x - xi) ~ 0 . This expression tells us that given the expected return R, 
variance/covariance matrix V, non-monetary return vector G, and fairness vector f, 
investors decide to invest in the cooperative membership if the expected utility from a 
portfolio containing a cooperative investment exceeds any other affordable portfolio. 
There are two ways of proving that Equation 5 is true. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions for Equation 5 can be derived using either Slutsky conditions or revealed 
preference conditions (Varian, 1983). Revealed preference conditions are used because 
this approach is more applicable for empirical analysis. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the mean-variance utility maximization of Equation 5 are described in 
Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1. If we assume that the mean-variance utility function is a monotonic, 
concave, and differentiable, then we know from the standard properties of concave 
functions that for xi and x1 , 
(6) i,j = 1, ... ,n. 
Furthermore the hypothesis of utility maximization implies that first-order conditions 
must be satisfied by the data. That is 
(7) j = 1, ... , n and A1 > 0 
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For the utility function represented in Equation 5, Equations 6 and 7 are rewritten as 
Equations 8 and 9. 
(8) 
Ui ~Uj +Mj(Rxi -Rxj)+E\Gxi -Gxj)+S\rpxi'Vxi -rpxj'Vxj)+Hj(fi/- fxj) 
i,j = 1, . .. ,n 
(9) withj = 1, . .. ,n and,1/ > 0 
where 
. BU(Rxj ,1,xj'Vxj Gxj fxj) H1 = ,'f' . ' ' 
B(.fx1 ) 
;/ = marginal utility of income. 
Equation 8 is the standard requirement for utility maximization which is property of 
concavity from Equation 6, and Equation 9 is the first-order conditions of the utility 
function that satisfied the Equation 7. Given the information about (pi, xi) , we can 
show U; ,M; > O;E; > O,S; < O,H; > Oand.l > 0 then Equation 8 holds and our mean-
variance utility function is concave, differentiable, and monotonic. 
Proof. Equation 8 describes the standard properties of concave functions and 
Equation 9 is the usual first-order conditions of the mean-variance utility function. We 
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assume U(xi)exist,Mi > O,Ei > 0, Si< 0, Hi> 0 and i > 0. That is the marginal 
utility of monetary returns is positive, the marginal utility of non-monetary benefits is 
also positive, the marginal utility of risk is negative, the marginal utility of fairness is 
positive, and the marginal utility of income is positive as well. 
We must show that given any x with pi xi ~ / x, U(xi) ~ U(x). In deriving the 
sufficient conditions for the mean-variance utility maximization model we need to 
define: 
Since the variance-covariance matrix Vis positive semi-definite, for all xi and x we 
can write the variance of portfolio x as (x- xi)'V(x-xi) ~ 0. By arranging this 
Now suppose that some x such that pixi ~pix. For notational convenience, let 
us define Ui = U(xi). Then we have 
(11) 
U(Rx,Gx,rpx'Vx,fx) = min{Ui +Mi(Rx-Rxi)+ Ei(Gx-Gx;) +Si(rpx'Vx-rpxi'Vxi)+ 
I 
which can be rewritten as: 
(13) 
U(Rx,Gx,rpx'Vx,fx) ~ Ui +Mi R(x-xi) + EiG(x-xi)+ 2Sirpxi'V(x-xi)+ Hi f(x-xi) 
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(15) U(Rx,Gx,rpx'Vx,.fx) ~ U; +).f p\x-x;). 
Since p; (x-x;) ~ 0, then 
(16) U(Rx,Gx,rpx'Vx,fx) ~ U; and 
(17) • 
Rationalizing the observed behavior of investors using a differentiable, concave, 
monotonic utility function will guarantee the existence of U;, M; > 0, E; > 0, 
S; < 0, H; > Oand).f > Othat satisfy the inequalities: U; ~ U 1 +J,./ p1(x; -x1 ) 
for i,j = 1, ... ,n. If there exist some values U; ,M; > O,E; > O,S; < O,H; > 0 
and ,;i_i > 0 for i = 1, ... , n that satisfy the inequalities above for some observed behavior 
of investors (p;, x;), i = 1, ... , n , then there must exist a continuous, concave, . 
monotonic utility function that rationalizes the observed behavior. 
Stage I: Initial Investment Decision 
The investor's interest is choosing xi to maximize utility. Changes in x; are 
changes in demand for investment. Suppose that xi is chosen to maximize the investor's 
utility. Let µ(x;) be the monetary returns, D(x;) be the non-monetary benefits, 
a2(x;) be the variance of returns, and F(x;) represents faimess. 6• For example, the 
amount of delivery rights purchased monetary and non-monetary benefits, risks, and 
6 In initial investment decision analysis the notations µ, D, a- 2 , and F are used for derivation purposes 
instead of Rx;, Gx;, rjJ x; 'Vx;, and .fx;, to make the utility function more general. 
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perception of fairness. Let us denote the maximum utility as M(xi) for different 
choices of xi. 
M(xi) = ~~U(µ(xi),D(xi), cr2(xi),F(xi)) 
subjectto g(xi ,W0 ) = Oandxi ~ 0 
so that the Lagrangian is 
(18) 
and the first-order conditions with respect to xi and A are 
(19) 
(20) 
( au(µ( x; ), D( x~; u' ( x'), F( x;) ))( aix~')) + 
( au(µ(xi),D(xi),cr 2 (xi),F(xi) ))(8F(~i))- A(8g(xi ,_W0 )) = 0 
8F 8:x' 8x' 
8L . 
-=g(x',W0 )=0 8,1 for i = l, ... ,n 
These conditions determine the optimal choice of x; which in turn determines the 
investment demand function is 
(21) 
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The envelope theorem7 gives a formula for the derivative of maximum utility 
function with respect to choice variable x; : 
(22) 
This equation shows how the maximum utility changes, given changes in xi. 
Stage II: Closed Cooperative's Decision Model 
The closed cooperative's objective function is to maximize net surplus, and the 
cooperative surplus function is determined by revenue, total production costs, and cash 
patronage refunds. Suppose there is a coalition S of M potential investors in a closed 
cooperative, M = (1, ... , m) . We assume that closed cooperative ( coalition S) produces 
consumer product, k, using purchased input from non-members plus input from 
members, z k , where the marginal cost of producing k is c( z k) and the total cost is 
C(zk). From our derivation of the investor's demand for cooperative investment we 
have x;* = xi• (R, G, rjJ V, f, /, W0 ). Assume this is a continuous and differentiable for 
all variables in the model. 
The aggregate demand for cooperative investment from the cooperative 
members in coalition S, 
(23) x~· = Ix~(R,G,</JV,f,p\W0 ) for Sr;;;, M 
}ES 
7 The proof of the envelope theorem can be found in Varian (1992) p. 502. 
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.. 
where x; is equivalent to owners equity which is determined by Equation 21 in Stage I. 
Total investment capital, Kk, can be obtained from owners equity and/or loans. Let Lk 
is the amount of investment capital to produce consumer product k from loans that is 
proportional to amount of capital invested/owners equity in the cooperative, 
.. 
Lk = r(x; ) where r is the loan leverage parameter. The cooperative investment 
. * . * . * 
capital is Kk = x; + r(x; ) = (1 + r) x; . 
Let B/zk,Kk)be the revenue that an investor obtains from an investment in a 
closed cooperative. Then we can say that the revenue for cooperative as a coalition Sis 
Bs(zk,Kk) = 'IB/zk,Kk) since j ES. If the cooperative's production function is 
)ES 
y~ = h(zk,Kk), then cooperative's revenue can be written as 
B s ( z k , K k ) = p ~ · h( z k , K k ) , where p~ is the price of consumer product k. The 
cooperative's surplus is: 
(24) 
where C(zk) = wz · zk is the total production costs associated with producing k and wz is 
the price for one unit of raw material/input. If z; is the optimum quantity of input that 
The cooperative's retained earnings (RE) are: 
8 The investment capital, K k , is a constant term which determined and fixed from Stage I of closed 
cooperative investment game tree. We assume that the cost of owner equity and loans are fixed. 
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where R8 ( z k) = w r • z k is the cash patronage refunds which can be earned by investors 
in coalition S with wr as the book value of each share of common stock at the present 
time. We can express the cooperative's retained earnings, RE: 
(26) 
The cooperative's retained earnings RE(zk,Kk) = 0 if cooperatives are not profitable to 
deliver R8 (zk)to investors or if not enough capital and delivery commitments. In either 
case, the cooperative fails to operate. 
To formally derive the cooperative maximizing behavior, Equation 24 may be 
rewritten as an optimization problem: 
(27) 
subject to wr · zk ~ E and 
where E is the maximum amount of shares allowable to be offered by the cooperative, 
and wr is the initial book value of each share of common stock (one share is equivalent 
to one unit of input delivered). 
The Lagrangian function is 
(28) 
By assuming that h(zk,Kk)is differentiable then the first-order and the second-order 
conditions with respect to z k and A are 
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then we get competitive factor demand, 
. (29) 
so the solution for the supply function maximizing the cooperative net surplus is 
(30) 
The Role of Fairness 
Suppose there is a two-player cooperative game with perfect information. The 
two players are the cooperative and an investor. The mixed strategy sets are TM and Tc 
for the investors and the cooperative, respectively. Let (R ·xi) M be the investor's 
expected return of portfolio choice xi. We assume that maximization of each player's 
expected utility is determined by their chosen strategy and their beliefs about the other 
player's strategy choices. Let GM E TM and Ge E Tc be the strategies chosen by the 
investor and the cooperative, respectively. The investor's beliefs about the strategy the 
cooperative is choosing is represented by be E Tc, and the cooperative's beliefs about 
what strategy the investor is choosing is represented by bM E TM. 
The fairness termfmeasures how fair an investor perceives the treatment of 
other players (cooperative) in the coalition. To formalize the investor's perceptions, it 
is necessary to develop a model that explicitly incorporates beliefs. The term 
fc (Ge, bM) explains how fair the cooperative is being by choosing strategy Ge . If the 
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cooperative believes that the investor is choosing strategy bM . The term fc ( ac, bM) 
measures how much more than or less than investor's equitable payoff, the cooperative 
believes the association is giving to the investor. The cooperative has the opportunity to 
choose the payoff pair [Re (ac, bM ), RM (bM, ac )] from among the set of all feasible 
payoffs if the investor is choosing strategy bM. The investor's equitable payoff is 
expressed by the following relationship R~ (bM) = [ Rt (bM) + R~ (bM )] I 2. R~ (bM) 
provides a reference point against which to measure how fair the cooperative is 
perceived as being to the investor, where Rt (bM) is the investor's highest payoff in 
X(bM) and R~ (bM) is the investor's lowest payoff among points that are Pareto-
efficient9 in X(bM ). The feasible set of Pareto-efficient points are the points in the set 
combinations Re and RM; and Tc is the set of pure strategies of the cooperative. The 
term X(bM) looks at the set of payoff combinations from the cooperative's perspective, 
and the cooperative takes into account its belief about which strategy the investor will 
choose (bM). Accordingly, X(bM) reflects the cooperative's belief about all players' 
payoff combinations in the opportunity set. 
From these payoffs, the fairness term is defined. This term captures how much 
more than or less than investor's equitable payoff the cooperative believes the 
association is giving to investor. 
Definition 2. The perception about the cooperative's fairness to the investor is given by 
9 Pareto-efficient is a point in which it is not possible to make one person better off without making at least 
one other person worse off. The pareto-efficient situation always reflects optimal point in the set of feasible 
points. 
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(31) 
If R! ( bM) - Rif ( bM) = 0 then all of the cooperative' s responses to strategy bM provide 
investor the same payoff. Therefore, there is no fairness issue and fc ( ac, bM) = 0 . 
Clearly, fc ( ac, bM) = 0 if and only if the cooperative gives the investor the equitable 
payoff. If fc ( ac, bM) < 0 the cooperative is giving the investor less than the equitable 
payoff. Finally, if fc ( ac, bM) > 0 the cooperative is giving the investor more than the 
equitable payoff. The investor's fairness to the cooperative is given by fM(aM,bc). If 
the investor believes that the cooperative is choosing strategy he then the term 
fM(aM,bc) measures how fair the investors are being to the coopertative. Figure 2 
shows the outcome term fc ( ac, bM) as a function of the level of payoff ( RM 's). This 
figure captures the producer's perception of fairn~ss: the higher the investor's payoff 
offered by the cooperative is compared to the equitable payoff, the higher the 
perception of fairness. 
The central feature of this fairness term is that if investors believe that the 
cooperative is treating them unfairly, thenfc(ac,bM) < 0, and the investor wishes to 
respond to the cooperative negatively by choosing strategy aM such that 
fM(aM,bc) < 0. However, if cooperative is delivering fair action to investors, 
fc ( ac, bM) > 0 , and then investors will provide the cooperative fair feedback. 
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Hypotheses 
This theory of cooperative investment shows that the cooperative enterprises that 
generate maximum expected utility to producers are preferred more than those that do 
not. Joining a closed cooperative may increase the investor's risk, especially if it is a 
start-up enterprise. There must be a meaningful reason that encourages investors to 
invest in a closed cooperative. Equation 21 in the previous section clearly generates 
three hypotheses related to the closed cooperative investment decisions. The first 
question to be addressed in this analysis then is whether non-monetary benefits from 
cooperative investment motivate producers to invest in a closed cooperative. Therefore, 
the first hypothesis is: 
H1 : Producers who want to create employment opportunities and support economic 
development in their local community are more willing to invest in a cooperative as 
part of their portfolio if that investment provides those non-monetary benefits. 
The impact of risks associated with cooperative investment on producer's 
expected utility and investment decisions is an important issue in this study. The second 
hypothesis is: 
H 2 : Risk-averse producers are more willing to invest in a closed cooperative if they 
perceive that investment to have relatively low risk. 
The third hypothesis is related to the psychological literature that eventually was 
used to study the implications of fairness in economic transactions. Evidence indicates 
that people's notions of fairness are heavily influenced by the status quo and other 
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reference points (Rabin, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1986a, b). Following this reasoning, 
the third hypothesis is: 
H 3 : Producers who are concerned about fairness are more willing to invest in a closed 
cooperative if that enterprise provides treatment that is perceived as fair. 
Summary 
The forces inducing change in agricultural cooperative institutions have led to 
the demand for a clear unifying theory of agricultural marketing cooperative 
development. A model of new generation cooperative investment based on investment 
theory is proposed by incorporating monetary, non-monetary, fairness, and risk 
components in the model. Our model incorporates non-monetary perception of the 
investors as an essential determinant influencing the formation of a cooperative. 
Investors judging whether or not to invest in a new generation cooperative not only 
consider monetary benefits from their investment but non-monetary benefits, fairness 
and risk as well. 
The closed cooperative investment involves a high degree of risk compared to 
many other investments. New generation cooperatives attempt to solve the equity 
problems of traditional cooperatives by changing the property rights structure. New 
generation cooperatives have a more clearly defined membership policy, a secondary 
market for members' residual claims, patronage refund claimant status restriction, and 
an enforceable member pre-commitment mechanism. 
The mean-variance cooperative portfolio model is proposed to capture the 
investor's rationality in undertaking investment decisions. As predicted, the rational 
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investors will decide to invest in the closed cooperative as part of his portfolio if the 
expected utility of a portfolio containing a closed cooperative investment exceeds the 
utility from any other affordable portfolio. 
The role of fairness in the new generation cooperative investment model 
captures several important issues of investor behavior. Investors' perception of fairness 
is heavily influenced by their reference points. For instance, the investors' view of the 
fairness of closed cooperative' management to the members can be influenced by how 
that firm has treated them in the past relative to their expectation. 
The model of closed cooperative investment can be viewed from a game 
theoretical approach as a sequential game with perfect information. In the cooperative 
formation stage, the potential investors observe the cooperative's management 
behavior, and this provides information on which investors make their investment 
decisions. In this game, the cooperative's management behavior can conceivably change 
the motivation of the investor to invest. A sequential game involves sequential strategies 
and a decisions process, and it will continue as long as the firm exists. 
In the earlier stage, the success of a coalition formation is greatly determined by 
the prospectus of that cooperative. If the cooperative's prospectus provides overly 
optimistic investment return expectations, initial positive perceptions may be created. In 
the second stage of the game, the investors have two alternative strategies: increase or 
decrease the investment for the next period of the operation. The decision is determined 
by utility as a member of the closed cooperative. If the cooperative delivers high utility to 
its members, again the investors will respond positively to the cooperative's management 
and increase their investment. Investors maximize utility subject to a wealth constraint 
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and they will decide to invest in the cooperative if the expected utility from a portfolio 
containing a cooperative investment exceeds any other affordable portfolio. Sequentially, 
the cooperative maximizes net surplus subject to maximum allowable shares to be 
offered to investors. 
The initial investment decision analysis provides the optimal value of demand 
for a closed cooperative investment in achieving maximum utility as a function of 
monetary return, social/non-monetary benefits, variance of the return, and fairness. 
Further research is obviously required, since comprehensive analysis with respect to the 
closed cooperative point of view needs to be developed. This study has provided the 
results from the investor side, and part of the analysis obtains and derives the supply 
function of the closed cooperative investment. The closed cooperative's production 
function was hypothesized as a function of purchased input from non-members plus 
input from members and investment capital. Although this is a very general hypothesis 
and requires further research, the cooperative management needs to consider this issue 
as important attribute to maintain a successful enterprise. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the survey design and questionnaire used to generate the 
data for testing the hypotheses from the theoretical model. The research question is: Do 
non-monetary benefits from investment, perception of fairness, and investment risk affect 
producers' expected utility and their investment decisions? 
Previous studies have not incorporated non-monetary benefits and investment risk 
into cooperative development and producers' decisions to invest in an agricultural 
cooperative. In addition, procedures for defining variables that account for the 
measurement of non-monetary benefits and investment risk on the investors' expected 
utility and investment decisions are presented. A questionnaire is used in a cross-
sectional survey of wheat producers as a data generating instrument to test the hypotheses 
suggested in Chapter 3. 
The questionnaire generates information about the producers' demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender, education level, and also includes their assets such as 
farmland acreage, farmland ownership, production, farm location, and years of farming. 
In addition, the questionnaire also requested information about producers' 
46 
expected return on investment, the perception of non-monetary benefits from cooperative 
investment, ability to use the tax credit benefits, opinion about the V AP Cooperative 
marketing contract, the producers' perception ofrisk associated with the cooperative 
investment, and the producers' perceptions of fairness about how the cooperative treats 
its members. 
Survey Design 
This study examines the hypotheses from the theory by comparing wheat 
producer members of V AP Cooperative and non-members of V AP Cooperative in terms 
of the effects of demographic characteristics, non-monetary benefits, fairness, and 
investment risk on the investor's expected utility and their investment decisions. The 
V AP Cooperative is a new generation cooperative which has a more unique 
marketing/production contract than do traditional open cooperatives. 
Data 
The surveys are directed to members of Value Added Products Cooperative 
Association, a closed cooperative at Alva, Oklahoma and wheat growers who are non-
members of V AP Cooperative. The survey instruments for the wheat producers allowed 
for comparison of the results between the two samples of wheat producers. The 
instrument allows comparison of qualitative and quantitative measures of the impact of 
non-monetary benefits and investment risk on the investor's expected utility and 
investment decisions in the agricultural cooperative. 
Each of the 712 V AP Cooperative members was sent a questionnaire by mail. The 
names of these 712 producers were obtained from VAP Cooperative in Alva, Oklahoma. 
A random sample of 1500 non-members ofV AP Cooperative was taken by the 
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Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics Service from its database (members were removed). 
Each randomly selected non-member also received a questionnaire by mail. Those who 
did not respond were sent a second questionnaire and received one telephone request to 
complete the questionnaire. One week after the first mailing of questionnaires, each of 
the wheat producers was sent a thank you postcard to thank them for their participation 
and to encourage them to respond if they had not returned the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was reviewed by a research project committee to ensure its 
accuracy and effectiveness. It was then approved by the V AP Board of Directors. The 
final version of the questionnaire consisted of 15 questions concerning producers' 
perceptions about their investment in V AP Cooperative. The questionnaire is in 
AppendixF. 
The V AP Cooperative questionnaire starts with questions about the respondent's 
farmland location, the length of time they have operated a farm business, wheat 
production, farm acreage, land ownership, and some wheat marketing questions. A 
section focuses on the respondent's familiarity with V AP Cooperative and their method 
of learning about V AP Cooperative. Respondents were asked about their expected rate of 
return on their V AP investment compared to other debt or investment interest rates. 
Respondents indicate whether they are able to claim the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer 
income tax credit as a result of their V AP investment or investments similar to V AP. 
Then, respondents indicate whether or not they have off-farm employment. Respondents 
were also asked to agree or disagree with several statements about whether perceptions of 
fairness, non-monetary benefits, tax credit, risk, marketing contract, and transferability of 
V AP' s share affected their investment decision. The last part of questionnaire includes 
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some questions on the respondents' demographic characteristics such as gender, age, and 
education level. 
The questionnaire was first mailed on January 28, 2002. One week later, a thank 
you postcard was mailed to all respondents. On February 25, 2002 the second mailing of 
the questionnaire was sent out to those who did not respond in the first mailing. Finally, 
those who still did not respond received a phone call requesting completion of the 
questionnaire. Some of the respondents who were called requested a third mailing. 
Responses from 298 respondents who did not invest and 323 respondents who did invest 
in V AP Cooperative were received. 
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Factor Analysis 
The survey of wheat producers produces a complex set of raw data for testing the 
hypotheses of the proposed model. Raw data consist of several sets of scores of N 
observations. A correlation exists between sets of scores that can be measured by the 
correlation matrix produced. The sets of scores that are recorded from question number 
11 are grouped by their classification related to the variables in the model. All of the 
items in the question 11 can be classified into four categories: (1) items that measure 
fairness; (2) items that measure attitudes toward the marketing contract; (3) items that 
measure social benefits; ( 4) items that measure risk. 
In order to simplify a complex set of data, factor analysis was used. Usually factor 
analysis is applied to the correlation matrix between a number of variables. Thus, factor 
analysis is designed to simplify large correlation matrices so that they can be explained in 
49 
terms of a few underlying factors. Essentially a factor is a construct operationally defined 
by its factor loadings10 (Royce, 1963). 
One of the types of factor analysis that is commonly used is principal component 
analysis. This type of analysis has simple algebra and computation techniques based on 
how the factors account for variance and explain correlations. The purpose of principal 
components analysis is to be able to estimate the correlation matrix, and this can be done 
by finding the characteristic equation of the matrix. This requires two sets of values, the 
characteristic vectors of the matrix or eigenvectors and the characteristic roots or 
eigenvalues. The eigenvector is a column of weights each applicable to one of the 
variables in the matrix. For example, if there are five variables there would be five 
weights in the first vector. The eigenvalue is the sum of squares of the factor loadings of 
each factor and reflects the proportion of variance explained by each factor. Thus, the 
larger the eigenvalue the more variance is explained by the factor. The principle method 
of eigenvalues and eigenvectors calculation is an iterative approach. A vector is tried and 
tested against a criterion set of values. To the extent that it diverges from the criterion, the 
., 
first trial vector is modified to produce a second vector and so on until the solution 
converges. 
Another method of factor analysis that has become popular in recent years is 
maximum likelihood factor analysis. Much of this originated from Joreskog in 1973. 
Maximum likelihood factor analysis differs from principal components analysis in terms 
of how variance is explained from the correlation matrix. Maximum likelihood factor 
analysis explains as much variance as possible in the population correlation matrix as 
1° Factor loadings are the correlations of a variable with a factor. Factor loadings can be obtained by 
multiplying each element of the eigenvector by the square root of the corresponding eigenvalue. 
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estimated from the sample correlation matrix. Thus, it must be separated from the 
principal components analysis that explains as much variance as possible in the sample 
matrix. 
Maximum likelihood factor analysis, as a method of condensation, is expected to 
search for factors. The strongest argument for choosing maximum likelihood factor 
analysis lies in the fact that it has statistical tests for the significance of each factor as it is 
extracted. 
However, Kline (1994) says that the non-statistical method for selecting the 
correct number of factors is highly efficient. He also noted that maximum likelihood 
factor analysis has become popular in recent years because of the development of some 
powerful multivariate statistical computer packages. The differences between those two 
methods are few, especially when test reliabilities and communalities11 are high. 
Significance of Factor Loadings 
The most critical element is whether a factor loading is significant or not, 
regardless of what method of condensation is used. Normally, a factor loading of 0.3 
indicates that 9 percent of the variance is accounted for by the factor. This is taken as a 
criterion to indicate that the loading is remarkable (Kline, 1994). This study regards a 
factor as a remarkable loading if the loading is above 0.3. 
11 Communality is the sum of squared of the factor loadings in each row of a factor matrix that indicates the 
proportion of variance in each variable which the factors can explain. 
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Procedure for Objective 2: 
Comparable data from members and non-members of V AP Cooperative were 
merged into one data set. Maximum likelihood factor analysis and principal component 
procedures were used to simplify the data. The central idea of factor analysis is to reduce 
the dimensionality of a data set that consists of a large number of interrelated variables, 
while retaining as much as possible of the variation present in the data set. This is 
achieved by transforming to a new set of variables which are uncorrelated and ordered so 
that the first few factors retain most of the variation present in all of the original 
variables. 
In principal component analysis, the analysis is performed by the FACTOR 
procedure in SAS. The following statements were used to obtain the results in the 
principal component analysis: 
PROC FACTOR [options]; 
VAR variables; 
RUN; 
The VAR statement specifies the numeric variables to be analyzed. Several options were 
used following the PROC FACTOR statement. The DATA= option specifies the input 
data set to be used, the OUT~ option creates a data set containing all the data from the 
DATA= plus variables called FACTOR], FACTOR2, and so on, containing estimated 
factor scores. The maximum number of factors to be extracted and the amount of 
memory to be allocated for factor matrices were specified by N= option. To obtain the 
basic statistic results e.g. means, standard deviations, and the number of observations, the 
SIMPLE option was used, and the CORR and EV options produce the correlation matrix 
52 
and the eigenvectors. The output includes all the eigenvalues and the pattern matrix for 
eigenvalues greater than one. 
Given the sets of scores from producers' responses with respect to question 11, 
items a through s, four social/non-monetary scores and five risk scores were available for 
analysis. The social data set contains the variables representing statements about: job 
creation in Alva is important (JOB), respondents knew people investing in V AP (P JV), 
respondents knew the people organizing V AP (MKW), and a statement about the 
respondents plans to attend the V AP annual meetings (MTG). The risk data set contains 
the variables representing statements about: V AP is a low-risk investment (LRS), the 
other investments are low risk (OLR), the probability ofVAP success was greater than 90 
percent (SCS), the probability of patronage refunds would be high (P RH), and shares in 
V AP will appreciate in value (SAP). The PROC FACTOR output begins with simple 
statistics, and the principal components are computed from the correlation matrix. The 
output also contains the table of eigenvalues of the correlation matrix, the eigenvectors 
matrix, and the factor pattern matrix 12• The factor pattern matrix interprets what those 
factors represent. The PROC FACTOR output also produces the final communality 
estimates that explain the proportion of the variance of the variables accounted for by the 
factors. If the factor analysis produces more than one factor, a plot of a factor against the 
others can be displayed to determine the magnitude of variance between factors. 
To produce better estimates in large samples, this study also used a maximum-
likelihood method that has desirable asymptotic properties. This method provides a 
statistical test about the number of factors that are retained and used to represent the 
original data set. To do the maximum-likelihood method, the METHOD=ML option was 
12 The factor pattern matrix is the matrix of correlations between variables and the factors produced. 
53 
used. The output results in hypotheses testing based on the chi-square test. The 
combination of two methods in this factor analysis provides better results because the 
principal component analysis was first used to get a rough idea of the number of factors 
before doing the maximum-likelihood analysis. 
Using the factors generated from the factor analysis, then the model is estimated 
using a Tobit procedure that is appropriate for the censored dependent variable. The 
independent variables are: expected return on investment, members' perception about 
non-monetary benefits generated by the cooperative investment, the risk associated with 
cooperative investment, members' perception about fair treatment delivered by the 
cooperative, experience with the cooperative marketing/production contract, years of 
farming, off-farm work hours, and awareness to the V AP Cooperative. 
The censored regression model in this study is estimated using the method of 
maximum likelihood. This model has both discrete and continuous parts in its dependent 
variable (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Instead of observing the decision to invest in 
V AP Cooperative, the data on the amount of shares producers invested are observed. 
Thus, using the Tobit model the observed dependent variable is given by 
(32) 
/. =0 I 
for ( > 0 
for ( ~o 
for i = 1, ... ,N 
where /* represents the amount of share units producers invested in the V AP Cooperative 
for those who joined the V AP Cooperative, and zero for those who did not join. 
Based on the closed cooperative investment demand function (Equation 21) in 
Chapter 3 the estimated equation is: 
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for i = 1, ... ,N 
where DISTANCE; is the distance of respondent i's farm location from V AP 
Cooperative in miles. YEAR; is the number of years respondent i has farmed. 
FAM/LIAR; is the variable for respondent i's awareness of the V AP Cooperative 
(FAMILIAR; = -2 if respondents are not familiar with the V AP Cooperative, -1 if 
respondents are less than moderately familiar, 0 if they are neither familiar or not, 1 if 
respondents are greater than moderately familiar, and 2 ifrespondents are highly 
familiar). FAIR; is the dummy variable representing the respondent's perception about 
fair treatment delivered by V AP Cooperative. This variable was measured by adding the 
scores provided by respondents according to the statements in items e and n (Table VII). 
CONTRACT; is the dummy variable representing the respondent's perception about V AP 
Cooperative marketing contract. This variable was measured by adding the scores 
provided by respondents according to the statements in items o and p (Table VII). By 
adding numerical scores, FAIR; and CONTRACT; variables were measured on a 2 to 10 
scale. 
RJSKl; and RISK2; are the first-two factors retained from ML factor analysis 
that represent the respondent's perception about risk on V AP Cooperative investment 
(From the raw data set, score = 1 if respondents strongly disagree with statements in 
items h, i,j, k ands (Table VII), 2 ifrespondents disagree, 3 if respondents are uncertain, 
4 if respondents agree, and 5 if respondents strongly agree). 
SOCIAL. is the first factor retained from ML factor analysis that represents the 
, I 
respondent's perception that V AP Cooperative creates social/non-monetary benefits to 
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investors (employment in the local community). The social factor is also measured using 
scores provided by respondents according to the statements in items a, b,f, and m, Table 
VII; RATE; is the expected rate of return from V AP Cooperative investment for 
respondent i, which is measured from responses to Question 7 in the questionnaire 
(RATE; = 1 ifrespondents need the rate ofreturn to be greater than the local bank's rate 
on a Certificate of Deposit, 2 if respondents need the rate of return to be greater than the 
loan rate that they pay on land, 3 if respondents need the rate of return to be greater than 
the loan rate that they pay for production expenses, 4 if respondents need the rate of 
return to be gr~ater than the rate that they pay for credit card debt). WORK; is the dummy 
variable for off-farm employment (WORK; = 1 ifrespondent is working off-farm and 0 
otherwise). TAX; is the dummy variable for the Oklahoma Agricultural producer income 
tax credit (TAX; = -2 ifrespondents strongly disagree with statements in item d, Table 
VII (Producers could take advantage of the 30% Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income 
tax credit), -1 if respondents disagree, 0 if they neither agree or disagree, 1 if respondents 
agree, and 2 ifrespondents strongly agree), and &; is the error term. 
Results: Survey of Value Added Products Cooperative 
Questionnaire results for members and non-members ofVAP Cooperative are 
presented in this section. The factor analysis and Tobit model results follow. 
Producer Characteristics 
Producer characteristics for those who invested and those who did not invest in 
V AP Cooperative are shown in Table I. 
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Table I. General Descriptive Information about Respondents in Study 
Characteristics V AP Members Non-Members 
Gender: 
Male 78.46 % 96.23 % 
Female 21.54 % 3.77% 
Education: 
Average 15.27 years 14.29 years 
High school 19.55 % 35.32 % 
College 55.77 % 49.81 % 
Post Graduate 24.68 % 14.87 % 
Average Age 56.86 years 58.16 years 
Percentage of income from wheat 63.66 % 61.13 % 
Averages: 
Farm acreage 1609.09 acres 1162.31 acres 
Acres of wheat 620.67 acres 422.86 acres 
Farmland was rented from others 34.77 % 38.87 % 
Wheat production in 2000 18,015.68 bushels 10,507.40 bushels 
Wheat production in 2001 16,717.32 bushels 9,348.57 bushels 
Number of years farming: 
Average 30.65 years 31.43 years 
More than 5 years 95.91 % 100.00 % 
More than 10 years 88.05 % 93.21 % 
Seventy-nine percent of the respondents that invested in V AP Cooperative were 
male while 96 percent were male that did not invest in V AP Cooperative. The mean for 
education level .was very similar at around 15 years with 20 percent of the V AP members 
finishing high school, 56 percent finishing college, and 25 percent finishing postgraduate 
programs. Almost fifty percent of non-investors were college graduates, and 35 percent 
with only a high school education. 
The mean ages were also very close for V AP members and non-V AP members at 
about 58 years. On average, the non-VAP members had been farming a little longer than 
the V AP members, 31.43 years and 30.65 years, respectively. All no~-V AP members had 
been farming for more than 5 years and 93.21 percent of them more than 10 years, while 
a majority ofVAP members (96 percent) had been farming for more than 5 years. 
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The mean farm acreage for VAP members was 1609.09 acres with 39 percent of 
those acres planted to wheat (620.67 acres) and non-VAP members having an average 
1162.31 acres with 36 percent in wheat (422.86 acres). Those producers who invested in 
VAP Cooperative rented an average of 34.77 percent of their farmland. Those producers 
who did not invest in VAP Cooperative rented an average of 38.87 percent of their 
farmland. The significant difference is in the average bushels for each group. The V AP 
members produced an average of 18,015.68 bushels in 2000 and 16,717.32 bushels in 
2001 while non-VAP members produced an average of 10,507.40 bushels in 2000 and 
9,348.57 bushels in 2001. Wheat was clearly a more important crop for members. Most 
of the producers from both groups have most of their gross income from their farm 
business, 63. 66 percent for V AP members and 61.13 percent for non-V AP members. 
Familiarity with V AP Cooperative 
Producers were asked to indicate how familiar they are with the V AP Cooperative 
and how they learned about the V AP Cooperative. Familiarity with V AP Cooperative is 
measured on a one to five scale, with a one being not familiar and five being highly 
familiar. Forty-three percent of producers that invested in V AP Cooperative were 
moderately familiar with V AP Cooperative while about 48 percent of non-V AP members 
were not familiar with V AP Cooperative (Table II). 
Table II. Percentage of Familiarity with Value Added Products Cooperative 
Level of familiarity V AP Members Non-Members (N=321) (N=280) 
Not familiar 0.62 percent 47.50 percent 
Less than moderately familiar 7 .17 percent 22.14 percent 
Moderately familiar 43.30 percent 21. 07 percent 
Greater than moderately familiar 25.86 percent 5.36 percent 
Highly familiar 23.05 percent 3.93 percent 
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Figure 3 suggests that familiarity level is positively related to the size of 
investment. Each dot represents one respondent. On average, thirty-three percent of all 
sample respondents were moderately familiar with V AP Cooperative. 
To find out how respondents learned about the VAP Cooperative, producers were 
asked to select the methods that they used to learn about V AP Cooperative. Respondents 
were offered five methods that producers would have used to learn about V AP 
Cooperative: (1) Attend a meeting where the prospectus for V AP was presented, (2) Read 
a magazine/newspaper article about V AP, (3) Saw television news report about V AP, ( 4) 
Discuss V AP with other farmers/producers, and ( 5) Others. 
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Figure 3: Investors' Familiarity with VAP Cooperative Investment Measure by Size of 
Investment 
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Table III shows the percentage of responses for each method of learning about 
VAP Cooperative. A majority of the investors (61.37 percent) learned about VAP 
Cooperative by attending a meeting where the prospectus for V AP was presented. 
Eighteen percent learned about V AP through discussion with other producers. About 12 
percent of investors learned about VAP Cooperative from other sources. However, none 
of the investors learned about V AP from television news reports. Sixteen percent of 
investors learned about the V AP Cooperative by attending a meeting and discussion with 
other producers. 
Reading magazine/newspaper articles about V AP is a majority response of non-
VAP members (55.97 percent). Twenty-six percent ofnon-VAP members learned about 
V AP Cooperative from other sources. About 10 percent of non-V AP members used 
discussion as the method ofleaming about VAP. Less than 2 percent of non-investors 
learned about VAP Cooperative from a television news report. Clearly, these results show 
that V AP members actively attended a meeting because they feel as a part of the 
company and they intend to spend extra time monitoring their investment. 
Table III. Percentage of Res2ondents' Method of Learning about VAP Coo2erative 
VAPMembers Non-Members 
Method of Leaming Percentage of Number of Percentage of Number of 
Responses Responses Responses Responses 
Attend a meeting where the 
prospectus for V AP was 
presented 61.37 197 7.00 17 
Read a magazine/ news-
paper article about V AP 10.28 33 55.97 136 
Saw television news report 
aboutVAP 0.00 0 1.23 3 
Discuss with other farmers/ 
producers about V AP 17.45 56 9.88 24 
Others 12.15 39 25.93 63 
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Required Rate of Return 
Producers were asked to indicate the rate of return on V AP investment or an 
investment similar to V AP that would be required for V AP to be a good investment. 
Respondents' required rates were compared to four different rates: the local bank rate on 
a certificate of deposit, the loan rate paid on land, the loan rate paid for production 
expenses, and the rate paid for credit card debt. Results of the questionnaire are shown in 
Table IV. 
Table IV. Percentage of Respondents' Required Rate of Return on V AP or an 
Investment Similar to V AP 
VAPMembers Non-Members 
Expectations Percentage Number of Percentage of Number of 
of Responses Responses Responses Responses 
Greater than the local bank's rate 
on certificate of deposit 33.23 106 25.38 66 
Greater than the loan rate that 
paid on land 13.79 44 15.38 40 
Greater than the loan rate that 
paid for production expenses 35.74 114 41.15 107 
Greater than the rate paid for 
credit card debt 17.24 55 18.08 47 
A majority of producers who are members ofVAP (36 percent) or non-members 
( 41 percent) required the rate of return on V AP investment or an investment like V AP to 
be greater than the loan rate that they pay for production expenses. About thirty-three 
percent of the members and 25 percent of non-members thought that the rate of return 
would need to be greater than the local bank's rate on a certificate of deposit. 
The V AP's Share Ownership 
Producers were asked how many shares they had purchased when they joined. 
Share ownership is shown in Table V. Sixty-eight percent ofVAP Member owned 
between 1,000 and 3,000 shares. About nineteen percent owned between 3,001 and 5,000 
shares. Three producers owned more than 20,000 shares. 
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' Table V. The Percentage of V AP Cooperative's share ownership 
Amount of Shares 
Between 1000 to 3000 shares 
Between 3001 to 5000 shares 
Between 5001 to 7000 shares 
Between 7001 to 10000 shares 
Between 10001 to 15000 shares 
Between 15001 to 20000 shares 
More than 20000 shares 
Minimal V AP Cooperative's share ownership is 1000 shares. 
Sources of Income 
Percentage of 
Responses 
68.03 
19.12 
2.19 
6.27 
1.57 
1.88 
0.94 
Number of 
Responses 
217 
61 
7 
20 
5 
6 
3 
Producers and spouses were asked to indicate whether they had off-farm 
employment as a source of family income. The producers and spouses' sources of income 
are summarized in Table VI. Producers and spouses with off-farm employment were 
asked the average number of hours per week spent at off-farm jobs. Producers with 
sources of income coming from wheat production were the majority of responses, sixty-
four percent for members and sixty-one percent for non-members. Thirty-six percent of 
members and 39 percent of non-members had income from off-farm employment. The 
percentage of spouses of non-members that worked off-farm is higher than for members 
(39 percent for members, and 49 percent for non-members). Note that members with off-
farm employment worked 33 hours per week and their spouses had 37 hours per week of 
off-farm employment. The off-farm working hours for non-members and their spouses 
are similar to members. 
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Table VI. The Percentage of Res2ondent's Sources of Income 
VAPMembers Non-Members 
Sources oflncome Percentage of Number of Percentage of Number of 
Responses Responses Responses Responses 
Gross income coming 
from wheat production 63.66 205 61.13 173 
Producers had off-farm 
employment 36.34 117 38.87 110 
Spouses had off-farm 
employment 39.06 116 49.24 130 
Investment Decision 
Results related to producers' attitudes toward VAP investment decisions are 
summarized in Table VII. Producers were asked to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with nineteen statements about non-monetary (social) benefits ofVAP 
membership, fairness, marketing contracts, and perceptions of risk. Many of the results 
present interesting contrasts between members and non-members. Most V AP members 
indicate that V AP Cooperative creates non-monetary or social benefits (items a, b,f, and 
m, Table VII). Eighty-two percent of members and only 37 percent of non-members 
agreed that creating jobs in Alva is important for them. Fifty-four percent of members 
said that other people that they knew were investing in V AP. Seventy-three percent of the 
investors said that they knew the people organizing V AP Cooperative, and 62 percent of 
them agreed that they would attend the V AP annual meetings. However, fifty-four 
percent of non-members stated that other people that they knew were not investing. 
Sixty-one percent of them did not know the people organizing VAP, and around fifty-one 
percent would not attend the V AP annual meetings if they were members. 
When asked about fairness issues such as treatment ofV AP to the investor, and 
distribution of patronage refund, more than 50 percent of members believe that V AP's 
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treatment and its patronage distribution were fair. Of non-members, sixty-three percent 
perceived that producers were not sure investors would be treated fairly in V AP and a 
very significant amount (79 percent) of them were uncertain about fairness of patronage 
distribution (items e and n, Table VII). 
Both members and non-members did not have a problem with marketing 
contracts. The facts showed that sixty-nine to 76 percent of members and more than 50 
percent of non-members preferred marketing contracts (items o and p, Table VII). 
The risks associated with V AP investment showed very interesting results. Thirty-
seven percent of investors agreed that V AP Cooperative is a risky investment compared 
to an investment in farmland. Forty-one percent of members and over forty-eight percent 
of non-members thought that their other investments were high risk. A majority of non-
members were not sure about risk associated with and V AP success in the future (items h, 
i,j, k ands, Table VII). 
The Oklahoma Agricultural Producer Income Tax Credit 
Investors' agreement toward the statement about whether or not they are able to 
take advantage of the 30 percent Oklahoma agricultural producer income tax credit 
apparently supports the investment hypothesis, as may be seen in Table VII, item d. 
Eighty-six percent of members said they could take advantage of the 30 percent 
Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit. Only forty-four percent of non-
members agree and expected to be able to take advantage of an income tax credit if they 
invested. In addition, investors were asked to indicate what percentage of the tax credit 
was used. Eighty-four percent ofVAP members said that they are able to use 81.89 
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Table VII. Members and Non-members' Attitude toward Statements about VAP 
Cool!erative Investment Decisions 
Statements V AP Members, in% Non-Members, in% 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Disagree Uncertain Agree 
a. Creating jobs in Alva is 
important for me 10.53 7.89 81.58 28.99 34.30 36.71 
b. Other people I know said they 
were investing in V AP 30.13 15.56 54.30 53.54 35.86 10.61 
C. The business prospectus for 
V AP appeared logical 3.63 13.20 83.17 15.31 51.53 33.16 
d. I could take advantage of the 
30% Oklahoma Agricultural 
Producer income tax credit 6.56 7.54 85.90 16.84 38.78 44.39 
e. Producers/investors in V AP 
will be treated fairly 3.64 27.15 69.21 8.21 62.56 29.23 
f. The people organizing V AP 
were known to me 13.58 13.91 72.52 60.82 24.23 14.95 
g. Shares in V AP can be bought 
and sold 23.51 33.11 43.38 12.76 72.45 14.80 
h. The probability of patronage 
refunds would be high 9.60 33.77 56.62 18.46 67.18 14.36 
i. V AP is a low-risk investment 
compared to investment in 
farmland 36.96 33.66 29.37 33.85 54.36 11.79 
j. My other investments are low 
risk 41.39 23.84 34.77 48.47 15.31 36.22 
k. The probability of V AP success 
was greater than 90% 15.89 40.07 44.04 30.41 62.89 6.70 
1. Producers need to form 
cooperatives to increase their 
income 7.92 20.13 71.95 11.56 28.14 60.30 
m. As an investor, I plan to attend 
the V AP annual meetings 8.94 29.47 61.59 51.31 42.93 5.76 
n. The planned patronage 
distribution from V AP is fair 2.33 40.20 57.48 11.28 78.97 9.74 
o. Marketing/production contracts 
are good for agriculture , 6.60 17.82 75.58 11.62 33.84 54.55 
p. Agric. Marketing coop are 
better if they have a marketing 
contract 4.32 26.91 68.77 11.73 35.71 52.55 
q. Only agricultural producers are 
allowed to participate in the 
VAPCoop 12.87 17.82 69.31 14.80 54.08 31.12 
r. Meeting wheat delivery 
requirements to V AP is 
relatively easy 1.66 7.28 91.06 19.80 63.96 16.24 
s. Shares in V AP will appreciate 
in value 4.64 45.03 50.33 11.34 77.84 10.82 
Strongly disagree and disagree are combined. Agree and strongly agree are combined. 
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percent of the tax credit, and around 15.58 percent of the members could not claim 
Oklahoma agricultural producer tax credit in 2000. 
Result: Maximum-Likelihood Factor Analysis 
The sets of scores obtained from item a to s (Table VII) provide respondents' 
perceptions about V AP Cooperative investment. Those scores were categorized into four 
categories for each of the 621 observations. Since each category is represented by more 
than one item, it is impossible to include all the items as variables in a regression model 
simultaneously. Factor analysis is used to summarize the scores in one or two 
dimensions. 
Social/Non-monetary Factor 
Identifying the number of factor(s) that best represents the social or non-monetary 
benefits is the first task. The eigenvalues indicate that one component provides an 
adequate summary of the data. One component, with eigenvalue 2.2721, accounts for 57 
percent of the total variance and two components explaining 75 percent of the variance, 
as may be seen in Table VIII. Based on NF ACTOR criterion, this analysis retains only 
one factor. The other basis that is commonly used to justify the number of factors that 
will be retained is the eigenvalues-greater-than-one rule. 
Table VIII. The Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix for Social/Non-monetary 
Benefits Factors 
Eigenvalue 
2.2721 
0.7302 
0.5364 
0.4613 
Difference 
1.5419 
0.1938 
0.0752 
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Proportion 
0.5680 
0.1826 
0.1341 
0.1153 
Cumulative 
0.5680 
0.7506 
0.8847 
1.0000 
The hypothesis testing related to the factor analysis of social or non-monetary 
benefits components are summarized in Table IX. The probability levels for the chi-
square test are less than 0.0001 for the hypothesis of no common factors, and 0.1153 for 
one common factor. Therefore, the one-factor seems to be an adequate representation of 
these data. 
Table IX. Hypothesis Testing for Searching the Number of Factors of Social/Non-
monetary Benefits of V AP Cooperative in Alva 
Test DF Chi-Square Pr> ChiSq 
H O : No common factors 
HA : At least one common factor 
H O : 1 factor is sufficient 
HA : More factors are needed 
6 
2 
435.2270 < 0.0001 
4.3202 0.1153 
The first factor is a measure of the overall social or non-monetary benefits factor 
since the first eigenvector shows approximately equal loadings on all variables. The first 
factor in Table X has large positive loadings for all four variables. The correlation with 
the statement 'V AP management are known to me', MKW (0.81743) is especially high. 
Table X. The First Factor Pattern for Social/Non-monetary Benefits Variables 
Variables Description Factorl 
JOB Creating jobs in Alva is important to me 0.77716 
PIV People that I know also invest in V AP 0.65032 
MKW V AP management are known to me 0.81743 
MTG I will attend the V AP annual meetings 0.75961 
Figure 4 plots the size of investment and the first factor of social/non-monetary 
benefits variables. There is an apparent positive relationship between investment size and 
the social benefits measure. 
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Figure 4: Investors' Perception about Social Benefits Measure by Size of Investment 
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Risk Factor 
The analysis related to the risk associated with the V AP Cooperative investment 
shows that two components provide an adequate summary of the complex sets of risk 
variables. The eigenvalues of the correlation matrix for risk factors are presented in Table 
XI. Two components with large eigenvalues, 2.40652 and 0.96494, together account for 
67 percent of the total variance. Two factors are retained based on the NF ACTOR 
criterion. This analysis is confirmed by the hypothesis testing in maximum-likelihood 
factor analysis, as may be seen in Table XII. With the probability level of chi-square 
0. 7231, the hypothesis test failed to reject the second null hypothesis and provides 
support that thetwo-factor model is sufficient to represent five variables. 
Table XI. The Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix for Risk Factors 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
2.40652 1.44157 0.4813 0.4813 
0.96494 0.28302 0.1930 0.6743 
0.68193 0.14269 0.1364 0.8107 
0.53923 0.13185 0.1078 0.9185 
0.40738 0.0815 1.0000 
The results in Table XIII provides factor patterns for the risk variables that shows 
the first factor is a measure of overall perception about risk associated with V AP 
Cooperative investment since the factor loadings and eigenvectors show approximately 
equal loadings on all variables. The second factor has high positive loadings on the 
variables OLR (Producers' other investments are low risk) and LRS (V AP is a low-risk 
investment compared to farmland), and high negative loadings on the variables P RH (The 
probability of patronage refunds would be high) and SAP (Shares in V AP will appreciate 
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in value). This second factor seems to measure the dominancy of investment financial 
risk perceptions over expectation of monetary benefits. 
Table XII. Hypothesis Testing for Searching the Number of Factors of Risk 
Associated with V AP Cooperative Investment 
Test DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
H 0 : No common factors 
HA : At least one common factor 
H O : 2 factors are sufficient 
HA : More factors are needed 
15 
4 
515.8326 < 0.0001 
0.1255 0.7231 
Figure 5 plots the size of investment as a function of investors' risk perception 
measures. There is an apparent positive relationship between investment size and the risk 
factor measure. Investors are willing to invest more if they perceive that V AP investment 
is low-risk, generates a high patronage refund, has a high probability of success, and 
V AP shares will appreciate in value. 
Table XIII. The Factor Pattern for Risk Variables 
Variables Description Factorl Factor2 
LRS V AP is a low-risk investment compared to 0.68897 0.15599 
farmland 
OLR Producers' other investments are low risk 0.37220 0.87479 
scs The probability ofVAP success was greater than 90 0.84430 0.00220 
percent 
PRH The probability of patronage refunds would be high 0.73035 -0.30590 
SAP Shares in V AP will appreciate in value 0.73963 -0.28597 
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Figure 5: Investors' Perception about Risks Associate with VAP Cooperative Investment 
Measure by Size of Investment 
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In order to get the whole picture of the producers' perceptions, fairness and 
contract should be included in the model. Since producers' perceptions about fairness and 
marketing contracts in V AP are represented by two items from Table VII, items e, n 
(fairness) and o,p (marketing contract), the factor analyses are not used to simplify the 
variables. Producers' perceptions about fairness and marketing contracts in V AP were 
measured by adding the two numerical scores provided by respondents according to the 
statements from Table VII. 
Result: Cooperative Investment Decisions 
The results of the censored regression analysis in Table XV provide some support 
to the hypotheses from the proposed theoretical model of this study. Before the results are 
interpreted, the rationale for including those variables in the model and their expected 
signs is explained. Table XIV provides the expected signs and rationale for including the 
variables in the V AP Cooperative investment model. 
The distance from Alva (DISTANCE) is included to indicate the evidence that the 
closer producers are to Alva, the more likely they are willing to invest. This variable is 
measured by taking the approximate shortest distance between Alva and the county seat 
of the county in which the producer is located. This measurement is provided by the 
Oklahoma Department of Transportation 1999-2000 Official State Map. 
The variable used to indicate producers' experience in farm business is 
represented by YEAR. This variable measures the impact of years of farming on 
producers' willingness to invest in the V AP Cooperative. The hypothesis that older 
farmers may have no desire to change or to improve their current portfolio by investing in 
V AP Cooperative is tested. 
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Producers' familiarity with the VAP Cooperative is included to reflect how the 
producers' awareness of the VAP Cooperative in Alva influenced the propensity to join 
the V AP Cooperative. FAM/LIAR is represented by Question 4 from the questionnaire. 
Table XIV. Expected Signs and Rationale of Selected Variables for VAP 
Cooperative Investment Model 
Selected Expected 
Variables Sign 
DISTANCE 
YEAR 
FAMILIAR + 
FAIRNESS + 
CONTRACT + 
RISKI + 
RISK2 
SOCIAL + 
RATE 
WORK 
TAX + 
Rationale for including the variable 
Producers with farmland that is far away from Alva are likely to invest 
less V AP investment than producers with farmland closer to Alva. 
Older farmers may have no desire to change or improve their current 
portfolio. 
Producers that are familiar with the V AP Cooperative may be more 
willing to invest in the V AP Cooperative. 
Perception that producers in V AP will be treated fairly and V AP patronage 
distribution is fair would increase producers' willingness to invest in V AP. 
Producers that perceive that marketing/production contracts are good for 
agricultural marketing cooperatives will be more willing to contract with 
V AP as investors. 
Perception ofVAP is a low-risk, high patronage refund, high probability 
of success, and shares will appreciate in value would increase producers' 
willingness to invest in VAP. 
Producers that prefer low financial risk for a given expected monetary 
return are less likely to invest in V AP Cooperative. 
The more producers perceive that V AP creates social/non-monetary 
benefits to investors, the more likely they are to invest in V AP 
Cooperative. 
Producers that need higher rates of return from their portfolio may be less 
willing to invest in V AP Cooperative. 
Producers working off-farm may have no extra time to spend monitoring 
their V AP investment and may less likely to invest in V AP Cooperative 
than full-time farmers. 
Producers that are able to take advantage of the 30% Oklahoma 
Agriculture Producer income tax credit, are more willing to invest in V AP. 
Variables to indicate fairness are shown as an agreement or disagreement with the 
following statements: "Producers/investors in VAP will be treated fairly", and "The 
planned patronage distribution from V AP is fair". Producers' perceptions about treatment 
and/or patronage distribution reflect the fairness factor in the censored regression model 
of V AP Cooperative investment. 
The marketing contract is included in the model to indicate producers' 
perceptions about the influences of a marketing contract in an agricultural processing 
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operation like VAP Cooperative. Respondents' perceptions were measured by asking 
them to express agreement or disagreement with the two following statements related to 
the marketing contract: "Marketing/production contracts are good for agriculture", and 
"Agricultural marketing cooperatives are better if they have a marketing contract". 
Perceptions that V AP is a low-risk investment, generates high patronage refund, 
has high probability of success, and its shares will appreciate in value are represented by 
two factors, RISK] and RISK2. Factor RISK] measures overall perception about risk 
associated with V AP Cooperative investment while factor RISK2 measures the perception 
that predominantly emphasizes a low-financial risk over the expected monetary return 
from VAP Cooperative investment. 
The hypothesis that producers are more likely to invest in V AP Cooperative if 
they perceive that V AP creates social/non-monetary benefits to investors, is indicated by 
the SOCIAL factor in the model. SOCIAL measures the overall perceptions about 
social/non-monetary benefits ofVAP Cooperative by the investors. 
The expected rate of return from V AP Cooperative investment (RATE) is included 
to indicate monetary benefits. This variable is measured by asking respondents to 
compare their needed rate of returns to the local bank's rate on certificate of deposit, the 
loan rate for land, the loan rate for production expenses, and the rate for credit card debt. 
To indicate the effect of off-farm employment on producers' willingness to invest 
in VAP, the variable WORK is included in the analysis. This variable is obtained by 
asking respondents to indicate whether or not they have off-farm employment. Finally, 
TAX is included to reflect the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit. This 
variable is expected to have a in a positive effect on V AP Cooperative investment 
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decisions. Respondents' perceptions toward statements about the advantage of the 
Oklahoma agricultural producer income tax credit was used to measure this variable. 
Accordingly, the LIFEREG procedure in SAS was used to estimate the model. By 
default, the LIFEREG procedure computes initial values for the parameters using 
ordinary least squares ignoring censoring. However, this might not be the best set of 
starting values for a given set of data. The log-likelihood function is maximized by means 
of a ridge-stabilized Newton-Raphson algorithm. A composite chi-square test statistic is 
computed for each variable, testing whether there is any effect from any of the levels of 
the variable. 
The amount of shares of the producers' investment varies considerably, with a 
minimum value of 1,000 shares and a maximum value of 100,000 shares. The mean 
producer investment is 3,589 shares with a standard deviation of 6,851.8. Results in 
Table XV show that among the explanatory variables, the number of shares producers 
invested in V AP Cooperative is positively related to F AMIL/AR and SOCIAL. The 
familiarity measure is positive and significant at the one percent level. Producers who are 
familiar with V AP Cooperative are more likely to invest and invest more. The coefficient 
of the social and non-monetary benefits measure is also positive and significant at the one 
percent level. Clearly, the results suggest that VAP Cooperative should create the 
perception and the belief that the enterprise produces social benefits to investors. RISK2, 
which represents overall responses of producers that predominantly emphasizes on low-
financial risk over the expected monetary return (risk averse) from V AP Cooperative 
investment, has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 10 percent level. Large 
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potential investors, who are risk averse, perceive that V AP Cooperative is a risky 
investment and will have less willingness to invest in V AP Cooperative. 
Table XV. Parameter Estimate of the Cooperative Investment Decisions Using 
Censored Regression Model 
Dependent Variables Lower Left Censored Values 190 
1. 
I Distribution Normal 
Number of Observations 486 Log Likelihood -2985.546976 
Noncensored Values 296 
Independent Variables Parameter Estimate Standard Errors 
Constant -119.478 1982.426 
DISTANCE** -9.1412 3.5079 
YEAR -20.6991 15.4161 
FAMILIAR** 1525.417 244.2891 
FAIRNESS 125.9939 238.9985 
CONTRACT 41.5314 163.6396 
RISKJ 77.4709 198.3475 
RISK2* -407.616 246.7011 
SOCIAL** 962.0520 245.4960 
RATE -6.3523 212.3705 
WORK* -1072.84 528.4470 
TAX*' 518.5784 257.4294 
** Significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level 
The number of shares of investment is found to be negatively related to the 
distance from Alva (DISTANCE) and off-farm employment (WORK). The result suggests 
that the key to success for V AP Cooperative investment will be determined dominantly 
by more full-time local agricultural producers' support. The farther their farmland from 
Alva, the less likely producers will invest in V AP Cooperative. Potential investors are 
also more likely to be full-time farmers. The distance from Alva (DISTANCE) and off-
farm employment (WORK) are significant at the one and five percent level, respectively. 
77 
Producers' experience in farm business (YEAR) and marketing contracts 
(CONTRACT) have the predicted sign but show no significant impact on VAP 
Cooperative investment decisions. Unless V AP marketing contracts change the 
perception and beliefs about marketing contract effectiveness they are not likely to 
influence investment decisions. 
Fairness perception (FAIRNESS), overall perception about risk associated with 
V AP Cooperative investment (RISK]), and expected rate of return (RATE) show the 
predicted signs, but are not significant. Agreement with the statement that investors can 
take advantage of the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit (TAX) shows a 
positive effect on the V AP Cooperative investment decisions. The income tax credit 
variable (TAX) is significant at the five percent level. Obviously, this result suggests that 
Oklahoma income tax credit was a factor in the investment decision. The value of tax 
refund is a function of the amount of investment that suggests the cooperative 
management should keep this government policy to ensure increasing producer 
investment. 
Discussion 
From the results of the V AP Cooperative investment decisions, it is apparent that 
the investors bear risks due to changes in the relative business environments that directly 
affect the VAP Cooperative as a new enterprise. However, many wheat producers in the 
Alva/Woods County area invested and became core investors in the V AP Cooperative. 
The empirical results give supporting evidence to explain this phenomenon. Regardless 
of the risks associated with V AP Cooperative investment, local agricultural producers in 
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Woods County invest because they believe that V AP Cooperative generates social 
benefits for the local community. 
This analysis focused more specifically on the investor's membership decisions. 
Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) explored the impacts of property rights on the incentive for a 
producer to invest in the cooperative. Their results that suggest that the property rights 
structure of U.S. agricultural cooperatives significantly affects members' incentives to 
invest in their organizations. Cook and Iliopoulos distinguished among three types of 
cooperative investment problem in the U.S.: the existence of the free rider, horizon, and 
portfolio problems. The analysis of this study differs from theirs in a number of ways. 
They used the property rights structure in order to evaluate the differences between 
traditional and new generation cooperative, while this analysis uses investment theory to 
understand producers' willingness to invest in the new generation than the traditional 
cooperatives. Their analysis did not consider social/non-monetary benefits, the perception 
of risk, and the perception of fairness toward closed cooperative investment. This 
analysis is concerned with non-monetary factors that greatly affect producers' investment 
decisions. For their analysis, they developed hypotheses based on the cooperative 
investment problems and evaluate them based on the property rights, while this study 
develops and evaluates the hypotheses based on the basic microeconomic concepts about 
maximization of utility function. 
The analysis in this study explicitly addresses the potential investor's choices 
regarding the investment decisions in order to better-understand the forces influencing 
the producer's investment decisions rather than looking at the property rights effects of 
the resulting investment. This is an important difference; the use of the investors' 
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perception measures rather than the property rights provides insights into the factors 
governing the investment decisions. Because perception reflects personal opinion it 
strongly affects behaviors and actions. By understanding the circumstances under which 
new generation cooperative investment is likely to be sufficient for a successful 
enterprise, investors are willing to support the existence of new generation cooperatives. 
Using the evidence from producers' response toward social benefits, this study 
finds that a closed cooperative can be initiated and will survive if there is significant 
support from local producers concerned about social/non-monetary benefits. 
Producers' responses clearly indicated that the V AP Cooperative is not viewed as 
a low-risk investment. Risk-averse investors are not as willing to invest in VAP 
Cooperative. Fairness did not impact producers' willingness to invest because cash 
patronage distribution in closed cooperatives was predetermined and should be agreed 
upon by each producer before the investment decisions were made. 
Summary 
The evidence examined in this chapter is, for the most part, consistent with the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The comparison of cooperative investment decisions 
between V AP members and non-members show that more explicit positive perceptions 
are required to convince people to make closed cooperative investments. The positive 
perceptions from local producers allowed the V AP Cooperative to exist and develop. 
V AP members clearly do not believe that V AP Cooperative was a low-risk investment as 
compared to investment in farmland. 
Factor analysis was used to simplify large correlation matrices so that they could 
be explained in terms of a few underlying factors. The statistical tests under maximum 
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likelihood method are used to test for significance of each factor. One-factor is an 
adequate representation of the producer's perception about social/non-monetary benefits 
of V AP Cooperative, while perception about risk associated with V AP Cooperative 
investment is represented by two factors. 
Econometric examination of producer investment decisions confirmed that social 
or non-monetary benefits have significant impacts on cooperative investment. Analysis 
demonstrated that a new generation cooperative needs strong support from local 
producers as core-investors to initiate and maintain the cooperative. Producers who are 
familiar with V AP Cooperative were willing to invest in V AP Cooperative, and 
producers with farmland far away from Alva are less likely to invest in V AP 
Cooperative. The preference for low-risk investment lowered producers' willingness to 
invest in V AP Cooperative. With regards to farm-employment status, full-time farmers 
show a greater intention to invest rather than did part-time farmers. 
These results highlight some of the forces that determine producer's investment 
decisions. Differences in producers' decisions need to be recognized by closed 
cooperative management. The implications of these findings are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Throughout the United States, many traditional cooperatives are struggling to 
survive while new generation cooperatives are increasing in size and number. There is 
little research analyzing institutional changes, which suggests a need for theoretical 
models as well as empirical analysis of such changes. New generation cooperatives are 
growing rapidly without a sufficient theoretical basis. Agricultural producers need to 
know how to evaluate this investment before they determine whether or not to invest in 
the new generation cooperative. 
The objectives of this study are to extend the theory of agricultural cooperatives 
by incorporating social/non-monetary benefits, investment risk, and fairness into the 
theory of coalition formation that influence producers' expected utility and investment 
portfolios that may include new generation cooperative investments. Hypotheses from the 
proposed theory are empirically tested. 
Chapter 2 is a review of the basic model of coalition formation and previous 
research on coalitions and fairness. Chapter 3 developed new results in closed 
cooperative theory to examine the forces that influence producer's investment decisions 
in a closed cooperative. Chapter 4 then tested some of the hypotheses using data about 
actual agricultural cooperative membership decisions. 
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Result for Objective 1: 
Objective I is to extend the theory of agricultural cooperatives by incorporating 
non-monetary benefits, the risk of investment, and fairness into the theory of coalition 
formation that influence producers' expected utility and investment decisions in new 
generation agricultural cooperatives. Investment theory is used to explain investment in 
new generation agricultural cooperatives. Further, the model utilizes the concept of a 
cooperative as a coalition in a framework of dynamic game theory. This dissertation does 
not use the observed data to measure the payoff configuration from the permissible 
coalition between the producers because the calculation is extremely difficult when there 
are thousands of potential participants. The model explains the development of an 
agricultural cooperative and provides criteria for evaluating closed cooperative 
investment decisions. 
Theoretical results in Chapter 3 generated hypotheses about new generation 
agricultural cooperative investment. As a start-up enterprise, a closed cooperative 
investment is likely to be much more risky than many other investments. The rational 
investors will decide to invest if utility from a portfolio that contains a closed cooperative 
investment exceeds any other affordable portfolio. Closed cooperative investment theory 
predicts the demand for cooperative investment as a function of monetary return, social 
benefits, variance of the return, and fairness. 
Chapter 3 uses closed cooperative theory to further predict that the supply 
function of cooperative investment is affected by purchased input from non-members, 
input from members, and investment capital, although this result was not empirically 
tested. 
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Result for Objective 2: 
Objective 2 is to test whether hypotheses from the proposed theory are supported 
by empirical evidence about producers' expected utility and investment decisions in an 
agricultural cooperative. The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 support the hypotheses from 
Chapter 3. The results are consistent with predictions obtained from closed cooperative 
investment theory. The consistency of the empirical results with the theoretical 
predictions of Chapter 3 indicates that closed cooperative investment theory can offer 
insights into forces that greatly determine producers' investment decisions. 
Based on the statistical tests using maximum likelihood factor analysis, one factor 
was considered an adequate representation of producer's perception about social/non-
monetary benefits, and two factors were an adequate representation. of perception about 
risk associated with V AP Cooperative investment. The factor that represents social/non-
monetary benefits explains 57 percent of the variance in the correlation matrix. The first 
risk factor is a measure of overall perception about risk associated with V AP Cooperative 
investment, while the second factor measures the dominancy of financial risk perceptions 
over the expectation of monetary benefits. 
The Tobit regression indicates that closed cooperative investment can be initiated 
and maintained: (1) if there is significant support from local producers, (2) if producers 
perceive that a closed cooperative provides social/non-monetary benefits, and (3) if it is a 
low-risk investment. Accordingly, the perception about fairness is not considered an 
essential determinant of producers investment decisions since the investor-cooperative 
relationship and patronage distribution were determined and should be agreed upon by 
both parties before contracts are signed. Chapter 4 clearly confirms that the lack of 
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publication and information related to V AP reduced the probability of investment, 
especially for producers who live further from the cooperative. V AP Cooperative 
investment is negatively related to producers' distance from Alva. Many non-members 
refused to provide their perceptions because of unfamiliarity with V AP Cooperative. 
With regards to farm-employment status, V AP Cooperative investment is more 
likely for full-time farmers. The Oklahoma agricultural producer income tax credit is an 
important incentive for producers to invest in VAP Cooperative. However, not every 
V AP member knows that he/she can take advantage of the 30-percent Oklahoma 
agricultural producer income tax credit. Cooperative management should suggest that the 
Oklahoma legislature maintain this policy and even support federalizing it to encourage 
closed cooperative development in other states. 
Lessons 
While much more work remains to be done, particularly regarding further 
empirical evaluation of the new generation cooperative investment model, the existing 
analysis provides a number of lessons for participants in the closed cooperative dynamic 
game. The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 provides insight into producers concern regarding 
participation in the closed cooperative membership. Producers' participation in closed 
cooperatives has an economic basis: risk, expected returns, and tax incentives are 
important factors influencing investment in new generation cooperatives. However, non-
monetary benefits are also important. 
Another lesson provided by closed cooperative theory is that it is important to 
understand the underlying forces and incentives motivating closed cooperative 
investment and their structures. The empirical results obtained from testing the 
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predictions of closed cooperative theory indicate that the necessary theoretical tools are 
available to agricultural economists to continue to explore the implications of closed 
cooperative investments for producers, cooperative managers, and government. 
Implications 
In addition to these lessons for investors in new generation cooperatives, the 
findings discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 suggest a number of wider implications. The nature 
of the new generation cooperative formation indicates a new criterion for maximizing the 
return on the investment of government funds in an agricultural cooperative, if the 
government decides it is socially desirable to promote new generation cooperative 
investment. 
In addition, government support for this investment can affect cooperative 
management efforts to increase positive social perceptions about closed cooperative 
investments. Simply knowing about, attending the meeting or reading a magazine article 
about this investment does not appear to be enough to influence participation unless these 
activities influence producers' beliefs. Personal contacts with large producers would 
appear to be the best way that cooperative organizers and management can influence 
participation. People who are well known by a large number of producers and 
professionals in their fields are more likely to be able to attract investors. The empirical 
results show that producers' familiarity with their perception about social/non-monetary 
benefits are key factors in closed cooperative investment decisions. 
Chapter 3 indicates that closed cooperative investment can be viewed as a 
dynamic game with perfect information between the cooperative and the producer. In the 
formation stage, the observed cooperative's behavior provides information to producers 
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to make decisions. The producers' perception with respect to the cooperative's behavior 
can conceivably change the producer's motivation to invest. Again, the cooperative 
manager can do something that will produce positive perceptions. In this stage, a 
cooperative's strategy is reflected by the business prospectus which greatly influences the 
success of the coalition formation. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
This study highlights one of the many questions raised by the analysis: is it 
possible to predict the cooperative-investors relationship when the cooperative is the 
concentration of the analysis? Related to this is another question: what are the key 
success factors that affect the supply of closed cooperative investment? What role does 
market power play in the dynamic game of closed cooperatives? Will it reduce or 
increase the incentives to invest for a given level of the marketing contract? These 
questions require further exploration. The ability of the extended theoretical framework 
to incorporate the observations of the development of the cooperative industry suggests 
that adapting the model to include such concerns may provide useful answers to these 
questions. This study may have limitations for application of the results since this is a 
case study of V AP Cooperative in Alva, Oklahoma that may or may not apply elsewhere. 
87 
REFERENCES 
Ahmadi-Estahani, Fredown Z., and Roland G. Stanmore. "Value of Australian Wheat and 
Flour Characteristics." Agribusiness: An International Journal 10 (1994):529-36. 
Akerlof, George A. "The Case Against Conservative Macroeconomics: An Inaugural 
Lecture." Economica 46 (August, 1979):219-37. 
Aumann, R. J., and M. Maschler. "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games." In 
Advances in Game Theory, (M. Dresher, L. Shapley, and A. Tucker, Eds.). 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1964. 
Barkema, Alan, Mark Drabenstott, and Kelly Welch. "The Quiet Revolution in the U.S. 
Food Market." Economic Review (May/June 1991):25-41. 
Belleflamme, P. "Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric 
Firms." Games and Economic Behavior 30 (2000):1-21. 
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History." Games 
and Economic Behavior 10 (1995):122-42. 
Bolle, F. and A. Kritikos. "Self-Centered Inequality A version versus Reciprocity and 
Altruism." Mimeo, 14/95, Europe-University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, 1998. 
Coase, Ronald. "The New Institutional Economics." The American Economic Review 88 
No.2 (May, 1998): 72-74. 
Connor, John, Dale Heien, Jean Kinsey, and Robert Wills. "Economic Forces Shaping 
the Food-Processing Industry." American Journal Agricultural Economics 671 
(1985a):1136-42. 
Connor, John M., Richard T. Rogers, Bruce W. Marion, and Willard F. Mueller. The 
Food Manufacturing Industries. Lexington Books, D.C. Health and Company, 
1985b. 
Cook, Michael. "Major Forces in the Agribusiness Environment of the 1990s." 
International Agribusiness Management Association Inaugural Symposium 1991, 
Proceedings:ll0-15. 
88 
Cook, Michael L. and C. Ilopoulos. "Ill-Defined Property Rights in Collective Action: 
The Case of US Agricultural Cooperatives" in C. Menard (ed.) Institutions, 
Contracts and Organizations, London, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000. 
Demsetz, Harold. "The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution." The American 
Economic Review 87 No.2 (May, 1997): 426-429. 
Espinosa, J .A. and B.K. Goodwin. "Hedonic Price Estimation for Kansas Wheat 
Characteristics." Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 16 (July, 1991):72-
85. 
Falk, Armin, and Urs Fischbacher. "A Theory of Reciprocity." Institute for Empirical 
Research in Economics University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 6, April 1999. 
Fehr, Ernst, G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An 
Experimental Investigation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 No.2 (May, 
1993):437-59. 
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and 
Cooperation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:3 (August, 1999):817-68. 
Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gachter. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity." Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 No.3 (Summer, 2000):159-81. 
French, B.C., L.L. Sammet, and R.G. Bressler. "Economic Efficiency in Plant Operations 
with Special Reference to the Marketing of California Pears." Hilgardia 24 (July, 
1956):543-721. 
Gachter, S. and A. Falk. "Reputation or Reciprocity? An Experimental Investigation." 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich, Working 
Paper No.19, May 2000. 
Goranson, R.E. and L. Berkowitz. "Reciprocity and Responsibility Reactions to Prior 
Help." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3 No.2 (1966):227-32. 
Greenberg, J. "Effects of Reward Value and Retaliative Power on Allocation Decisions: 
Justice, Generosity, or Greed?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 
No.4 (1978):367-79. 
Greene, William H. Econometric Analysis. Third Edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1997. 
Guth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze. "An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum 
Bargaining." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 (1982):367-88. 
89 
Horowitz, John K., Richard E. Just, and Sinaia Netanyahu. "Potential Benefits and 
Limitations of Game Theory in Agricultural Economics." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 78 (August, 1996): 753-60. 
Isaac, R.M., J.M. Walker, and S.H. Thomas. "Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An 
Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations." Public Choice 43 
(1984):113-49. 
Johnson, S.R. "Strategic Behavior, Institutional Change, and the Future of Agriculture." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80 (1998): 898-915. 
Jolliffe, LT. Principal Component Analysis. New York: Springer-Verlag, Inc., 1986. 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch, and R.H. Thaler. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market." The American Economic Review Vol.76 
No.4 (September, 1986a):728-41. 
_______ . "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics." Journal of Business 
59 No.4 (October, 1986b):S285-S300. 
Kim, 0. and M. Walker. "The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence." Public 
Choice 43 (1984):3-24. 
Kinsey, J. "Changes in Food Consumption: From Mass Market to Niche Markets." 
Chapter in Food and Agricultural Markets: The Quite Revolution, Lyle P. Schertz 
and Lynn M. Daft, eds., Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association Report 
No. 270, 1994. 
Kline, Paul. An Easy Guide to Factor Analysis. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Ladd, George W. "A Model of a Bargaining Cooperative." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics (August, 1974): 509-19. 
Ladd, G.W. and V. Suvannunt. "A Model of Consumer Good Characteristics." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 58 (August, 1976):504-10. 
Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames. "Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV: 
Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?" Journal of Public Economics 15 
(1981):295-310. 
Mas-Colell, A. "An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining Set." Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 18 (1989):129-39. 
Newell, Alan. Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1990. 
90 
Okun, Arthur. Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis. Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1981. 
Orbell, J., A. van de Kragt, and R. Dawes. "Explaining Discussion-Induced 
Cooperation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 No.5 (1988):811-
19. 
Ostrom, Elinor. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14 (Summer, 2000):137-58. 
Phillips, M.J. "Changes in Technologies: Opportunities and Challenges for American 
Agriculture." Chapter in Food and Agricultural Markets: The Quite Revolution, 
Lyle P. Schertz and Lynn M. Daft, eds., Washington, D.C.: National Planning 
Association Report No. 270, 1994. 
Rabin, Matthew. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics." The 
American Economic Review 83 No.5 (Dec., 1993):1281-1302. 
Rabin, Matthew. "Psychology and Economics." Journal of Economic Literature 36 
(1998): 11-46. 
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar V., Okuno-Fujiwara M., and Zamir S. "Bargaining and Market 
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental 
Study." The American Economic Review 81 No.5 (Dec., 1991): 1068-1095. 
Ruttan, Vernon W. and Yujiro Hayami. "Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional 
Innovation." Journal of Development Studies 20 (July, 1984): 203-223. 
SAS Institute Inc. SASIETS User's Guide. Version 6. First Edition. Cary, NC: SAS 
Institute Inc., 1988. 
Schotter, Andrew. "The Evolution of Rules." Chapt. 5 in Economics as a Process: Essays 
in the New Institutional Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986. 
Schultz, Theodore W. Restoring Economic Equilibrium: Human Capital in the 
Modernizing Economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990. 
Sexton, Richard J. "Imperfect Competition in Agricultural Markets and the Role of 
Cooperatives: A Spatial Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
72 (August, 1990):710-20. 
____ . "The Formation of Cooperatives: A Game-Theoretic Approach with 
Implications for Cooperative Finance, Decision Making, and Stability." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (May, 1986):423-36. 
91 
Shubik, Martin. "Game Theory, Complexity, and Simplicity, Part III: Critique and 
Prospective." Complexity 3 (1998, No.5):34-46. 
Solow, Robert M. "On Theories of Unemployment." American Economic Review 70 
(March, 1980):1-11. 
Staatz, John M. "Farmer Cooperative Theory: Recent Developments." USDA, ACS 
Research Report No. 24, Washington, D.C. June 1989, 30pp. 
____ . "The Cooperative as a Coalition: A Game-Theoretic Approach." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 65 (December, 1983):1084-1089. 
Torgerson, Randall E., Bruce J. Reynolds, and Thomas W. Gray. "Evolution of 
Cooperative Thought, Theory, and Purpose." Electronic document. Available at 
http://www.wisc.edu/uwcc/info/torg.html 
Varian, Hal R. "Nonparametric Tests of Models oflnvestor Behavior." Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18 No.3 (September, 1983):269-78. 
Varian, Hal R. "Microeconomic Analysis." Third Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1992. 
Veeman, M.M. "Hedonic Price Functions for Wheat in the World Market: Implication for 
Canadian Wheat Export Strategy. " Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
35 (1987):535-52. 
Williamson, Oliver E. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead." Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVIII (September, 2000):595-
613. 
Yeutter, Clayton. "Global Agribusiness in the 1990s: Practical Effective Policies." 
International Agribusiness Management Association Inaugural Symposium, 1991, 
Proceedings:60-63. 
Zhou, L. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition 
Formation." Games and Economic Behavior 6 (1994):512-26. 
92 
APPENDICES 
93 
APPENDIX A 
OKLAHOMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER CREDIT 
~5201 
TAX YEAR 
2001 For Oklahoma agricultural producors who invost in Oklahoma agricultural procossing or markoting vonturos. 68 O.S. Soction 2357.25 and Rulo 710:50-15-85 
Name as shown on return (investor) Social Security Number or Federal 
Identification Number 
Provide the location(s) and the type of agricultural commodities being produced by the investor. 
Name of the agricultural processing cooperative, venture or rnarketing association Federal Employees Identification Number 
Provide the location(s) and the type of agricultural commodities being produced. processed or marketed. Also provide a 
detailed description of activity. 
CREDIT COMPUTATION 
1. Total Amount of Direct Investment ... .... ..... . .... .. .. .... $ 
2. Rate .. ........ . ... ... ....... .. ... ............. .. . ... ... ... . ... 30% 
3. Total Credit Allowable ..... ......... .. .. ... ... ........ .. ... ..... .. $ 
4. Amount of Credit Used in 2001 (cmry to form 511CR) .. $ 
5. Amount of Unused Credit ............... $ 
CREDIT CARRYOVER-The credit not used rnay be carried over, in order, to each of the six (6) yems following the year in which 
the investment was originally rnade. If any of the investment is sold or otherwise disposed of in a year prior to the credit being 
used, the credit, available for carryover. must be reduced. See below for computation. 
TAX YEAR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Unused Credit from PreviOlls Year 
Amount of Credit Used 
Unused Credit Available for Cmryover 
DISPOSITION OF INVESTMENT 
For the taxable year during which the investrnent. or any portion thereof is sold or otherwise disposed of. the amount of the 
credit allowed in prior years or being allowed in the current year shall be added to Federal Adjusted Gross Income to arrive at 
Oklahoma Adjusted Gross Income. Any unused carryover credit will be reduced to account for the sale or disposition. 
DOLLAR AMOUNT 
1. Total Amount of Original Investment 2001 . .. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . .. ............ .. ... ............... 1 . 00 
2. Less: Amount of Investment Sold or Disposed of ................................... .... ........... 2 . 00 
3. Net Investment Remaining <1fter Sale or Disposition . ........... . . .. . .. . . . . . . 3 . 00 
4. Rate ....... . . .. . .. . .. . ..... .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. ... .. . .. . .. .. ... . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . . 4 . 30% 
5. Revised Credit Allowable 5. 00 
6. Less: Credit used in previous or current tax year(s) and not previously recaptured 6. 00 
Subtract the amount on line 6 from the amount on line 5, if the result is a 
negative number enter <1rnount on line 7. If the result is 8 positive number 
enter amount on line 8. 
7. Credit to be recaptured and included in income. Enter <1mount as a positive number on 
the other income or other additions line of the Oklahoma tax return .. 7. 00 
8. Revised credit available for cmryover to tax year 8. 00 
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AGRICULTURAL CREDIT - 68 0.S. SECTION 2357.25 AND RULE 710:50-15-85 
There shall be allowed a credit for direct investments by Oklahoma agricultural producers in Oklahoma producer-awned 
agricultural processing cooperatives, ventures or marketing associations created and designed to develop and advance the 
production, processing, handling and marketing of agricultural commodities grown, made or manufactured in this state. The 
credit shall be thirty percent (30%) of the amount of the investment. If the credit allowed exceeds the tax liability, the amount 
of unused credit may be carried forward for a period not to exceed six (6) years. 
The credit shall not be available or taken for any calendar year during which the claimant of the credit received any incentive 
payments pursuant to the Oklahoma Quality Jobs Program Act or the Saving Quality Jobs Act. 
DEFINITIONS: 
"Oklahoma agricultural producer'' means any person who produces agricultural commodities in this state. 
"Direct investment" means the payment of money in or the transfer of any form of economic value, whether tangible or 
intangible, other than money to an Oklahoma producer owned agricultural processing cooperative, venture or marketing 
assocl aUon. 
"Agricultural commodities" means a farm or ranch product, including but not limited to, wheat, corn, soybeans, cotton, timber, 
cattle, hogs, sheep, horses, poultry, animals of the families bovidae, cervidae and antilocapridae or birds of the ratite group 
produced in farming or ranching operations or a product of such crop or livestock in its unmanufactured state such as ginned 
cotton, wooldip, maple syrup, milk and eggs. or any other commodity listed under any Industry Group Number under Major 
Group 20 of Division D of the Standard lridustrial Classification .(SIC) Manual. 
"Oklahoma producer-owned agricultural processing cooperative" means a legal entity, in the nature of a partnership or 
business, undertaking agricultural transactions or agricultural commercial enterprises for mutual profit. The entity must be 
controlled by the Oklahoma agricultural producers and a community of interest in the performance of the undertaking, 
transaction or enterprise; a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith; and the duty, which may be altered 
by agreement, to share both in profit and losses are required. The term does not include a cooperative that provides only, and 
nothing more than, storage, cleaning, or transportation of agricultural commodities. 
"Oklahoma producer-owned agricultural processing venture" means a legat entity, in the nature of a corporation or company, 
organized to invest in or operate an agricultural commodity processing facility. The facility must be operated primarily for the 
processing or production of marketable products from agricultural ,commodities. The term shall include a dairy operation that 
requires a depreciable investment of at least two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) and •which produces milk from 
dairy cows. The term does not include a venture that provides only, and nothing more than, storage, cleaning, or 
transportation of agricultural commodities .. 
"Oklahoma producer-owned agricultural processing marketing association" means a legal entity organized to jointly market 
agricultural commodities; facilitate the marketing process; and lo prornote. and stimulate the processing, sales, and marketing 
of agricultural commodities. The term does not include a marketing association that provides only, and nothing more than, 
storage, cleaning. or transportation of agricultural commodities. 
"Dairy operation" means and includes equipment and facilities to store and prepare feed, dairy cows, milking parlors, bulk 
cooling tanks, buildings, and all such depreciable investment commonly utilized in the dairy industry. 
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APPENDIXC 
Date: Friday, November 30, 2001 
Oklahoma State University 
Institutional Review Board 
Protocol Expires: 11/29/02 
IRS Application No AG0216 
Proposal Title: THEORY OF COOPERATIVE EVOLUTION 
Principal 
lnvestigator(s): 
Dan Tilley 
422AG 
Stillwater, OK 74078 
Reviewed and 
Processed as: Exempt 
Hubertus Puaha 
422Ag Hall 
Stillwater, OK 74078 
Approval Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): Approved 
Dear Pl: 
Your IRB application referenced above has been approved for one calendar year. Please make note of the 
expiration date indicated above. It is the judgment of the reviewers that the rights and welfare of individuals 
who may be asked to participate in this study will be respected, and that the research will be conducted in a 
manner consistent with the IRB requirements as outlined in section 45 CFR 46. 
As Principal Investigator, it is your responsibility to do the following: 
1. Conduct this study exactly a·s it has been approved. Any modifications to the research protocol 
must be submitted with the appropriate signatures for IRB approval. 
2. Submit a request for continuation if the study extends beyond ·the approval period of one calendar year. 
This continuation must receive IRB review and approval before the research can continue. 
3. Report any adverse events to the IRB Chair promptly. Adverse events are those which are 
unanticipated and impact the subjects during the course of this research; and 
4. Notify the IRS office in writing when your research project is complete. 
Please note that approved projects are subject to monitoring by the IRB. If you have qu~stions about the IRB 
procedures or need any assistance from the Board, please contact Sharon Bacher, the Executive Secretary to 
the IRB, in 203 Whitehurst (phone: 405-744-5700, sbacher@okstate.edu). 
Sincerely, 
~d (JUrr--
. Carol Olson, Chair 
Institutional Review Board 
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~ .•.... ··.··· .. ·.····A··.·.i .. •··.·.·.····:······.·.·.·.· .. • .. c• .. · .. · .. ·.•·•·.·.\ ................... u ...... ·.···.·.·.i ............................. ·.••· .. ···•··• \:JJ·· .. ···.•·.• .. · 
<<Gq111piu.1y:>r 
<<FirstName»·.·«LastName» 
<<Addr¢ss» · 
<<.GitY>t, ~<$t;:1W~>··.<<ZipGocl.¢>? 
Dear VAP investors, 
,,,. 
f'. L {\!\ ;\ s ·r /\ Ii E ( ~.,.;_, 
OiviSion· .. of]g1:cultu1oliSci~fi.ces•.and.··Nqt(f1ol Res~·(Jl(ffS 
·Q~fio1tment 9\~griruitµ(ol. E~onon1ics 
808Agikulfo1iJJffciH 
Srillwoter, Oklolwmo 7407B'6926 
405:744,6 i57, .6154, 6081, 6086 
fox.405)44'8210 <(MailingID» 
~s you··.·know,: Value ... A.dded .Products is.·.Qklalfoiha'.s .fi:tsfnew generation.cooperative: 
'The pµrpose .•ofthis .questionnaint istq•·.pi'ovide a bettet • Ui1detstm1dint•.why yoti andothets 
t11ve$tec:I.i11a new•generatiqn agi:ic1.IlturaLcooperative Hke YAP. The snccess· of ne.w 
generationcooperativ1::s•is pot¢11tial1y··i111pqrtantf9r·m(;l11y area$ qfQkl<l.1,10111.a. 
The 111fort11a~bhYoii provide· is• sttictl)!· confide~tial .• Su~mmries of the.responsesanddafa·· 
provi~¢d will be presented to fheVAP Cooperative to .help·them.evahiate business 
ll:9tiyities c1ndxe~pond, to. Sliggestfons. 
$hoµlµyonJ1ave·.(ll,lest10ns,1boutthisre$earch; please cot1ta¢tL)r. l)Miel. $-!~UeJ', 
Rrofessorf405-744-615(j),.Dr .. Rodney B. Holco111b, Jfood Eco11om.ist(4Q5.-744~.6'2.7/.2J, .c;J 
Huhert1.1s Ruaha., .. Graduate R.esearch.A.ssistant in.Agdcultur~l ~c~nomics(4Q5-744., 
6042.}. Blea.se return the.completed.questionnaire· in the.attached postage .. paid envelope. 
Tli~nk yqu.fQryour participation. 
114~ 
I)cl1ti¢l'$, Tilley 
Professor 
H\tberta.s Pu.c1ha 
Graduate. Itesea,rch Assista1Jt 
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RbdheyJ3. Hokoilib 
Fo9d Eco11on1ist 
January 24, 2002 
Dear wheat producers, 
F ' •. ) 
Oklahoma recently had its first new generation cooperative in Alva, Oklahoma. 'fhe 
purpose of this questionnaire is to provide a better understanding of why wheat producers 
do or do not invest in a new generation agricultural cooperative like Value Added 
Products (VAP) in Alva, Oklahoma. We hope to better understand the circumstances . 
under which new generation cooperative business investment is likely to be sufficient for 
a successful enterprise. 
The information you provide is strictly co11fidential and used only for resectrch purposes. 
Should you have questions about this research, please contact Dr. Daniel S. Tilley, 
Professor (405-744-6156), Dr. Rodney B. Holcomb, Food Economist (405-744-6272), or 
Hubertus Puaha,Graduate Research Assistant in Agricultural Economics (405-744-
6042). Please return the completed questionnaire in the attached postage paid envelope. 
Thank you for your pat1icipation. 
Sincerely, 
Daniel S. Tilley 
Professor 
Hubertus Puaha 
Graduate Research .Assistant 
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Rodney B. Holcomb 
Food Economist 
APPENDIXE 
Script for Telephone Request to Complete the Questionnaire 
Questionnaire No. 
-------
Name: Interviewer: 
----------~ 
---------
Date Time 
(Rural Route) 1st call to 
---------- ---
2nd call to 
---------- ---
3rd call to 
---------- ---
(City) 
Phone: (~--~) ______ _ 
Sex: (M) (F) 
Hello Mr./Mrs. , I am (state name) and I am 
working for Oklahoma State University at Stillwater. I am contacting you regarding to 
the mail survey that are conducted by the Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Oklahoma State University. This mail survey is used to collect the data for study on the 
development of new generation agricultural marketing cooperative in Oklahoma. Your 
participation in this survey is voluntary, and all information will be kept confidentially 
and used only for research purposes. 
Did you receive the questionnaire that we sent to you? 
Yes. Did you fill it out and return it in the attached postage paid envelope? 
_ Yes (Stop). Thank you for your participation. 
_ No. Would you let me asking you some questions related to that 
questionnaire? 
(Note: If he/she agrees to answer the questions, continue to the questionnaire) 
No. Would you let me asking you some questions related to that 
Questionnaire? 
(Note: If he/she agree to answer the questions, continue to the questionnaire) 
Otherwise, 
Is that OK ifwe send the new one for you? 
Is your mailing address still at ? (Check the address). 
_ No. What is your new mailing address? 
_ Yes. (Stop). We really appreciate if you will fill it out and 
return it to us. 
Thank you very much. 
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Value Added Products Cooperative Survey (Member) 
1. a. In what county is your farm located? (the majority) _________ _ 
b. How many years have you operated a farm? years. 
2. How many bushels of wheat did you produce/harvest in 2000 and 2001? __ _ 
bushels in 2000, bushels in 2001. 
3. a. What is your total farm acreage? ______ acres. 
b. What percentage of the land you farmed in 2001 was rented from others? __ %. 
c. How many acres of the crop land were used for wheat production in 2001? __ 
acres. 
d. To what company/cooperative did you sell the largest portion ofyour wheat in 2001? 
Company/cooperative name __________________ _ 
Town 
--------------
4. Please indicate how familiar you are with Value Added Products (V AP) Cooperative in 
Alva, Oklahoma? (Put X inside [ ] ) 
Not 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Less Than 
Moderately 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Moderately 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Greater Than 
Moderately 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Highly 
Familiar 
[ ] 
5. How did you learn about V AP Cooperative in Alva, Oklahoma? (Check all that apply). 
[ ] Attend a meeting where the prospectus for V AP was presented . 
. [ ] Read a magazine/newspaper article about V AP. 
[ ] Saw television news report about V AP. 
[ ] Discuss with other farmers/producers about V AP. 
[ ] Others (please describe) __________________ _ 
6. Do you own shares in V AP? 
[ ] Yes. If Y§, how many? _____ shares. 
[] No 
7. To be a good investment for you, the rate ofreturn on your VAP investment would need 
to be: ( check all 
that apply) 
[] Greater than the local bank's rate on CD's (Certificate of Deposit). 
[ ] Greater than the loan rate that I pay on land. 
[ ] Greater than the loan rate that I pay for production expenses. 
[ ] Greater than the rate I pay for credit card debt. 
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8. In 2000, were you able to claim the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit as 
a result of your V AP investment? 
[] Yes. If~, what percentage of the tax credit was used? %. 
[] No 
9. Do you have off-farm employment? 
[ ] Yes. Average number of hours employed off-farm _hours/week. 
[] No 
10. Does your spouse have off-farm employment? 
[] Yes. Average number of hours employed off-farm_ hours/week. 
[] No 
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements as they relate 
to your decision to invest or not to invest in V AP? (Place the corresponding number for 
each statement) 
Strongly Disagree - 1 Disagree - 2 Uncertain - 3 Agree - 4 Strongly Agree - 5 
a. __ Creating jobs in Alva, Oklahoma is important to me. 
b. __ Other people I know said they were investing in VAP. 
c. __ The business prospectus for V AP appeared logical. 
d. __ I could take advantage of the 30% Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax 
credit. 
e. __ Producers/investors in VAP will be treated fairly. 
f. __ The people organizing V AP were known to me. 
g. __ Shares in V AP can be bought and sold. 
h. __ The probability of patronage refunds would be high. 
i. __ V AP is a low-risk investment compared to investment in farmland. 
j. __ My other investments are low risk. 
k. __ The probability of VAP success was greater than 90 percent. 
I. __ Producers need to form cooperatives to increase their income. 
m. __ As an investor, I plan to attend the V AP annual meetings. 
n. __ The planned patronage distribution from VAP is fair. 
o. __ Marketing/production contracts are good for agriculture. 
p. __ Agricultural marketing cooperatives are better if they have a marketing 
contract. 
q. __ Only agricultural producers are allowed to participate in the VAP Cooperative. 
r. __ Meeting wheat delivery requirements to VAP is relatively easy. 
s. __ Shares in V AP will appreciate in value. 
12. Gender: M F 
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13. Age: __ 
14. Education level: (circle one of the number) 
Elementary High School College Post Grad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+ 
15. Do you have additional comments? 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. 
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Value Added Products Cooperative Survey (Non-member) 
1. a. In what county is your farm located? (the majority) __________ _ 
b. How many years have you operated a farm? ____ years. 
2. How many bushels of wheat did you produce/harvest in 2000 and 2001? ___ _ 
bushels in 2000, bushels in 2001. 
3. a. What is your total farm acreage? ______ acres. 
b. What percentage of the land you farmed in 2001 was rented from others? __ %. 
c. How many acres of the crop land were used for wheat production in 2001? __ 
acres. 
d. To what company/cooperative did you sell the largest portion of your wheat in 2001? 
Company/cooperative name--------------------
Town 
--------------
4. Please indicate how familiar you are with Value Added Products (VAP) Cooperative in 
Alva, Oklahoma? (Put X inside [ ] ) 
Not 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Less Than 
Moderately 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Moderately 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Greater Than 
Moderately 
Familiar 
[ ] 
Highly 
Familiar 
[ ] 
5. How did you learn about VAP Cooperative in Alva, Oklahoma? (Check all that apply). 
[ ] Attend a meeting where the prospectus for V AP was presented. 
[ ] Read a magazine/newspaper article about V AP. 
[ ] Saw television news report about V AP. 
[ ] Discuss with other farmers/producers about V AP. 
[ ] Others (please describe) ___________________ _ 
6. Do you own shares in V AP? 
[] Yes.If~,howmany? _____ shares. 
[] No 
7. To be a good investment for you, the rate ofreturn on an investment like VAP would 
need to be: (check all that apply) 
[ ] Greater than the local bank's rate on CD's (Certificate of Deposit). 
[ ] Greater than the loan rate that I pay on land. 
[ ] Greater than the loan rate that I pay for production expenses. 
[ ] Greater than the rate I pay for credit card debt. 
8. In 2000, were you able to claim the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit as 
a result of an investment in an agricultural processing operation? 
[] Yes. If~, what percentage of the tax credit was used? %. 
[] No 
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9. Do you have off-farm employment? 
[] Yes. Average number of hours employed off-farm _hours/week. 
[] No 
10. Does your spouse have off-farm employment? 
[] Yes. Average number of hours employed off-farm_hours/week. 
[] No 
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements as they relate 
to your decision to invest or not to invest in V AP? (Place the corresponding number for 
each statement) 
Strongly Disagree - 1 Disagree - 2 Uncertain - 3 Agree - 4 Strongly Agree - 5 
a. __ Creating jobs in Alva, Oklahoma is important to me. 
b. --. Other people I know said they were investing in V AP. 
c. __ The business prospectus for V AP appeared logical. 
d. __ I could take advantage of the 30% Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax 
credit. 
e. __ Producers/investors in V AP will be treated fairly. 
f. __ The people organizing V AP were known to me. 
g. __ Shares in V AP can be bought and sold. 
h. __ The probability of patronage refunds would be high. 
i. __ V AP is a low-risk investment compared to investment in farmland. 
j. __ My other investments are low risk. 
k. __ The probability of V AP success was greater than 90 percent. 
1. __ Producers need to form cooperatives to increase their income. 
m. __ As an investor, I plan to attend the V AP annual meetings. 
n. __ The planned patronage distribution from V AP is fair. 
o. __ Marketing/production contracts are good for agriculture. 
p. __ Agricultural marketing cooperatives are better if they have a marketing 
contract. 
q. __ Only agricultural producers are allowed to participate in the V AP Cooperative. 
r. __ Meeting wheat delivery requirements to V AP is relatively easy. 
s. __ Shares in V AP will appreciate in value. 
12. Gender: M F 
13. Age: __ 
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14. Education level: (circle one of the number) 
Elementary High School College Post Grad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+ 
15. Do you have additional comments? 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. 
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